A King\u27s Word: Pre-1949 Chinese Bonds and a Framework for Pursuing Claims on  Classically  Time-Barred Bonds by Plambeck, Charles C.B.
NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Volume 46 Number 2 Article 4 
2021 
A King's Word: Pre-1949 Chinese Bonds and a Framework for 
Pursuing Claims on "Classically" Time-Barred Bonds 
Charles C.B. Plambeck 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Charles C. Plambeck, A King's Word: Pre-1949 Chinese Bonds and a Framework for Pursuing Claims on 
"Classically" Time-Barred Bonds, 46 N.C. J. INT'L L. 389 (2021). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj/vol46/iss2/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Journal of International Law by an authorized editor of Carolina Law 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu. 
 
A King’s Word: Pre-1949 Chinese Bonds and a 
Framework for Pursuing Claims on “Classically” 
Time-Barred Bonds 
Charles C.B. Plambeck† 
“O kingis word shuld be o kingis bonde[.]”1 
  
I.  Introduction ............................................................... 390 
II.  The Bondholders’ Prima Facie Case ......................... 393 
A. Imperial and Republican Chinese Bond  
Issuances ............................................................. 393 
 Qing Era Bonds ............................................. 394 
 Republican Era Bonds ................................... 398 
B. The PRC Succession to Power, Default and  
Non-Payment ...................................................... 400 
C. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission ............ 400 
D. China Enters the Global Capital Market ............. 401 
III.  Jurisdiction in United States Federal Courts ............. 402 
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction over Foreign 
Sovereigns ........................................................... 402 
1. Schooner Exchange and Absolute Immunity 402 
 Tate Letter and Restrictive Immunity ............ 404 
 Lead Up to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act of 1976 .................................................... 406 
 The FSIA ....................................................... 407 
B. The Applicability of the FSIA Commercial Activity 
Exception to Pre-1949 Bonds ............................. 408 
1. What is a “Foreign State”? ............................ 409 
2. What is a “Commercial Activity”? ................ 411 
3. What is a “Direct Effect”? ............................. 412 
4. Retroactivity .................................................. 415 
IV.  Defenses of the PRC .................................................. 416 
 
† J.D., University of North Carolina School of Law; M.I.E.F., Johns Hopkins School of 
Advanced International Studies. 
 1 Describing the duties of a king during the Arthurian era. JOANNA MARTIN & EMILY 
WINGFIELD, PREMODERN SCOTLAND: LITERATURE AND GOVERNANCE 1420-1587, 95 
(2017) (quoting LANCELOT OF THE LAIK (Margaret M. Gray ed., 1912), a major Arthurian 
romance, circa 1460-1479).  In modern English, this quote reads, “A king’s word should 
be a king’s bond.”  Id. 
390 N.C. J. INT'L L. [Vol. XLVI 
A. Successor Government ....................................... 416 
B. Odious Debt ........................................................ 419 
C. Statute of Limitations .......................................... 421 
 Injury of Nonpayment of Principal and  
Interest ........................................................... 422 
 Tolling from Lack of Forum due to a “Superior 
Power” ........................................................... 422 
a. Absolute Sovereign Immunity ................. 424 
b. Tate Letter ................................................ 424 
c. The FSIA ................................................. 425 
 Pari Passu Obligations ................................... 427 
a. NML Capital v. Argentina ....................... 427 
b. Remedies ................................................. 430 
V.  Concluding Framework ............................................. 432 
A. Jurisdiction .......................................................... 432 
B. Procedural Bars ................................................... 433 
C. Substantive Requirements ................................... 434 
D. Remedy ............................................................... 436 
VI.  Conclusion ................................................................. 436 
 
I. Introduction 
As President Donald Trump’s campaign against Chinese trade 
practices gained momentum in 2018,2  multiple news outlets 
 
 2 On March 31, 2017, President Donald Trump signed executive orders calling for 
stricter trade policy enforcement and for a comprehensive review of trade deficits.  See 
Remarks on Signing Executive Orders on Trade, 2017, DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 213 (Mar. 
31, 2017); see also Exec. Order No. 13,785, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,719 (Apr. 5, 2017); Exec. 
Order No. 13,786, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,721 (Apr. 5, 2017) (“Free and fair trade is critical to 
the Nation’s prosperity, national security, and foreign policy.  It is in America’s economic 
and national security interests to promote commerce by strengthening our relationships 
with our trading partners, vigorously enforcing our Nation’s trade laws, improving the 
overall conditions for competition and trade, and ensuring the strength of our 
manufacturing and defense industrial bases . . . . The United States must address the 
challenges to economic growth and employment that may arise from large and chronic 
trade deficits and the unfair and discriminatory trade practices of some of our trading 
partners.”).  This was followed by the imposition of tariffs against Chinese imports, a probe 
into alleged Chinese intellectual property theft, and an examination of imports and trade 
practices that could impair the national security of the United States.  Statement on 
Proposed Additional Tariffs Against China, 2018 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 221 (Apr. 5, 
2018); Memorandum on Addressing China’s Laws, Policies, Practices, and Actions 
Related to Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Technology, 2017 DAILY COMP. PRES. 
DOC. 572 (Aug. 14, 2017).  See generally U.S. DEP’T OF COM., BUREAU OF INDUST. & SEC., 
OFF. OF TECH. EVALUATION, THE EFFECT OF IMPORTS OF STEEL ON THE NATIONAL 
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reported a curious story.  The plot: a group of American citizens 
petitioned President Donald Trump to press claims against the 
People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) dating as far back as the 
Imperial Qing Dynasty.3  The citizens are holders of unpaid bonds 
issued by China before 1949, the year the PRC was formally 
proclaimed by Chairman of the Communist Party of China, Mao 
Zedong.4  These bondholders argue that the PRC, as the legal 
successor to the governments that issued the bonds, must satisfy the 
defaulted bonds.5  The bondholders met with President Trump in 
person, and reportedly “he and his financial and economic advisors 
were almost universally in support of pursuing payment from China, 
or using it to claim an offset against the U.S. debt obligations to 
China.”6  By their estimate, $750 billion of these bonds are held by 
Americans.7  With China holding over $1 trillion of the United 
States’ debt,8  could reviving the pre-1949 debt claims be a valid 
offset, or serve as leverage in negotiations with China?9   
 
SECURITY: AN INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 232 OF THE TRADE EXPANSION 
ACT OF 1962, AS AMENDED (2018), https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/steel/ 
2224-the-effect-of-imports-of-steel-on-the-national-security-with-redactions-
20180111/file [https://perma.cc/37P6-W28T]. 
 3 See Tracy Alloway, Trump’s New Trade War Tool Might Just Be Antique China 
Debt, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 29, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2019-08-29/trump-s-new-trade-war-weapon-might-just-be-antique-china-debt 
[https://perma.cc/LHZ7-GHS7]. 
 4 See China Owes America over $1 Trillion in Sovereign Debt, AM. BONDHOLDERS 
FOUND., http://americanbondholdersfoundation.com/ [https://perma.cc/55P5-YGL3] (last 
visited Oct. 30, 2020) [hereinafter China Owes America]. 
 5 A Timeless Argument: American Creditors Say China Should Honour Pre-
Communist Debts, ECONOMIST (Sept. 29, 2018), https://www.economist.com/finance-and-
economics/2018/09/27/american-creditors-say-china-should-honour-pre-communist-
debts [https://perma.cc/TE7Q-577E] [hereinafter China Should Honour Pre-Communist 
Debts]. 
 6 Steve Gill, Steve Gill Commentary: Is a Tennessee Foundation a Key to Resolving 
Debt and Trade Issues with China?, TENN. STAR (Nov. 27, 2018), 
https://tennesseestar.com/2018/11/27/steve-gill-commentary-is-a-tennessee-foundation-
a-key-to-resolving-debt-and-trade-issues-with-china/ [https://perma.cc/2JH6-QPV8]. 
 7 See China Should Honour Pre-Communist Debts, supra note 5; China Owes 
America, supra note 4. 
         8 Major Foreign Holders of Treasury Securities (in Billions of Dollars), U.S. DEP’T 
OF TREASURY, https://ticdata.treasury.gov/Publish/mfh.txt [https://perma.cc/S6QV-
EZHV] (last updated Dec. 15, 2020); U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY ET AL., FOREIGN PORTFOLIO 
HOLDINGS OF U.S. SECURITIES AS OF JUNE 28, 2019, 13 ex. 6, 30 ex. 14 (2020), 
https://ticdata.treasury.gov/Publish/shl2019r.pdf [https://perma.cc/K9M5-HY7Z]. 
 9 The holders of the Chinese debt are private parties and not the federal government; 
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Finding a Rembrandt at a flea market is a bewitching dream not 
easily dispelled.10  Although the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) has sought to enjoin the offering and selling 
of bonds to vulnerable individuals,11  as explained in Part I of this 
article, the bondholders have a prima facie case for recovery.12  
Imperial and Republican China incurred valid debt for legitimate 
 
however, at minimum, the federal government would benefit from tax revenues of any 
proceeds recovered by the bondholders.  See, e.g., Jonathan Garber, $1.6T in Century-Old 
Chinese Bonds Offer Trump Unique Leverage Against Beijing, FOX BUS. (May 14, 2020), 
https://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/historic-chinese-bonds-trump-leverage-beijing 
[https://perma.cc/E65D-5SZK].  The possibility that the federal government could 
legitimize a claim of that magnitude might also provide leverage in other bilateral matters 
with China.  Id. 
 10 See REGINALD SCOT, THE DISCOVERIE OF WITCHCRAFT 147 (Brinsley Nicholson 
ed., Elliot Stock 1886) (1584) (“How manie have beene bewitched with dreames, and 
thereby made to consume themselves with digging and searching for monie & c: whereof 
they, or some other, have drempt?  I my selfe could manifest as having knowne how wise 
men have beene that waie abused by verie simple persons, even where no dreame hath 
been met withall, but waking dreames.”). 
 11 See Complaint at 1, SEC v. Caldwell, No. 5:18-cv-00434 (W.D. La. Mar. 29, 2018) 
(alleging that the pastor of one of the largest Protestant churches in the country defrauded 
elderly investors by selling them pre-Revolutionary Chinese Bonds that were “mere 
collectible memorabilia with no meaningful investment value”); Complaint at 4-5, SEC v. 
Harper, No. 5:18-cv-00436 (W.D. La. Mar. 29, 2018) (explaining that the “bonds have 
been in default since 1939 and the current Chinese government refuses to recognize the 
debt” and that the defendants misrepresented the bonds as, inter alia, “‘risk free’” and 
omitted facts indicating that the bonds are in default and no liquid market exists).  Press 
Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Prominent Pastor, Financial Planner 
in Scheme to Defraud Elderly Investors (Mar. 30, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-
release/2018-51 [https://perma.cc/7TX2-LA6M]. 
 12 Professor Mark Weidemaier of the University of North Carolina School of Law 
and Professor Mitu Gulati of Duke University School of Law argue that “at least in theory, 
the holder of one of these instruments could sue the current Chinese government for non-
payment.”  Mark Weidemaier & Mitu Gulati, Pre-Revolutionary Chinese Debt: An 
Investment for the Truly Stable Genius, CREDIT SLIPS (July 21, 2019), 
https://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2019/07/pre-revolutionary-chinese-debt-an-
investment-for-the-truly-stable-genius.html [https://perma.cc/J6F3-5CCJ].  They hasten to 
clarify that certain avenues of using these old bonds to offset current debt owed to the PRC 
are impossible at worst, incredibly unlikely at best, and the only realistic path “is for the 
U.S. government to intervene politically [by] try[ing] to pressure the PRC to pay some 
kind of compensation.”  Mark Weidemaier & Mitu Gulati, Enough with the Old Chinese 
Debt Already, CREDIT SLIPS (Sept. 10, 2019) https://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/ 
2019/09/enough-with-the-old-chinese-debt-already.html [https://perma.cc/RSJ7-XQ55] 
[hereinafter Weidemaier & Gulati, Enough with the Old Chinese Debt Already] 
(discussing the theory that bondholders might assign their claims to the United States, 
which, under 28 U.S.C. § 2415, could use these otherwise time-barred claims to reduce 
U.S. debt against China if China tried to enforce its own claims against the United States). 
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governmental purposes.13  As their successor government, the PRC 
is liable for that debt, and14  as of the writing of this article, the PRC 
has not paid the debt.15  Part II reveals that U.S. federal courts have 
jurisdiction to hear claims against the PRC because a foreign 
sovereign is not immune from suits involving commercial activities 
such as raising capital.16  However, many prospective plaintiffs may 
be turned away if the “direct effects” in the United States are too 
remote.17  As set out in Part III, those plaintiffs that survive the 
“direct effects” bar are likely to prevail against the defenses that the 
PRC is not the successor to the debt and that the debt is so odious 
as to be unenforceable.18  Another hurdle that may be 
insurmountable to many plaintiffs is the statute of limitations: the 
time to enforce claims for non-payment of interest and principal has 
passed.19  The argument that the statute of limitations has been tolled 
by lack of an adequate forum is not likely to prevail.20  Plaintiffs 
whose bonds have a perpetual pari passu clause have a glimmer of 
hope, but this can easily be extinguished by a court interested in 
quieting matters.  In short, the time for digging for treasure seems 
to have passed.21   
II. The Bondholders’ Prima Facie Case 
A. Imperial and Republican Chinese Bond Issuances 
The history of China from the late 19th century to the fall of the 
Republic of China on the mainland is reflected in its bond 
 
 13 See PAUL E. ECKEL, THE FAR EAST SINCE 1500, 272–80 (Harcourt, Brace & Co. 
1947).  Most of the bonds issued during this period either funded the First Sino-Japanese 
War, funded reparation afterward owed to Japan, or funded the construction of railroads.  
See id. at 194, 273, 465–66. 
 14 See infra Section III.A. 
 15 See infra Section II.B. 
 16 See infra Part II. 
 17 See infra Section III.B.3. 
 18 See infra Part III. 
 19 See infra Section IV.C.1. 
 20 See infra Section IV.C.2. 
 21 SCOT, supra note 10, at 147 (“And if the time of digging be neglected, the devil 
will carry all the treasure away.”).  The inter-governmental aspects of the claims are a 
separate but intertwined matter.  As mentioned, there is a U.S. statute—28 U.S.C. § 2415—
that allows the United States to bring stale counterclaims against its creditors.  See 
Weidemaier & Gulati, Enough with Old Chinese Debt Already, supra note 12. 
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issuances.22  Broadly, the bonds provided capital to fund the 
construction and operation of telegraphs, railways, roads and other 
projects essential to the economic development of China.23  These 
bonds also funded war efforts, and, when unsuccessful, indemnity 
payments to the victors.24  China’s debt resulted in an unsustainably 
high debt service burden, reflecting either fair risk premiums for a 
turbulent emerging economy, exploitative rates coerced by power 
imbalances, or a combination of both, depending on one’s 
perspective.25   
Qing Era Bonds 
By the late 19th century, China had been under the rule of the 
Qing dynasty for over two centuries.26  European interest in China 
rose at the end of the 18th century, when European countries grew 
into maritime trading powers and European consumers sought 
Chinese goods.27  European silver flowed to China to pay for the 
goods, which resulted in trade imbalances and the depletion of 
European silver reserves.28  The British, seeking to stem this silver 
hemorrhage, took advantage of the popularity of opium in China: 
Britain began growing opium in British-controlled India and selling 
it to China.29  China and Britain went to war in the First Opium War 
 
 22 For a longer survey of older Chinese bonds, see generally, 1 TREATIES AND 
AGREEMENTS WITH AND CONCERNING CHINA, 1894-1919: MANCHU PERIOD (1894-1911) 
(John V. A. MacMurray ed., 1921) [hereinafter TREATIES 1] (containing a variety of bond 
treaties made by China between 1894 and 1911); and 2 TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS WITH 
AND CONCERNING CHINA, 1894-1919: REPUBLICAN PERIOD (1912-1919) (John V. A. 
MacMurray ed., 1921) [hereinafter TREATIES 2] (containing a variety of bond treaties made 
by China between 1912 and 1919). 
 23 See ECKEL, supra note 13, at 279. 
 24 See TREATIES 1, supra note 22, at 110; ECKEL, supra note 13, at 272–80, 465–66. 
 25 See, e.g., ECKEL, supra note 13, at 272–80, 465–66. 
 26 See generally 1 FREDERIC E. WAKEMAN, THE GREAT ENTERPRISE: THE MANCHU 
RECONSTRUCTION OF IMPERIAL ORDER IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY CHINA (1985). 
 27 See id at 11–24, 34–45, 54–59; Anthony Reid, Preface to SOUTHEAST ASIA IN THE 
EARLY MODERN ERA: TRADE, POWER, AND BELIEF, at xxiii–xxviii (Anthony J. Reid ed., 
1993).  
 28 China accepted silver as currency. See WAKEMAN, supra note 26, at 144.   
 29 PETER W. FAY, THE OPIUM WAR, 1840-1842, 73, 180–81, 185–89 (1997).  The 
Chinese paid for the opium in silver: consequently, silver flowed out of Britain to China 
to buy Chinese goods, but out of China back to Britain in exchange for opium, evening 
Britain’s silver levels.  See id. at 180–81, 185–89. 
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after China sought to end the opium trade.30  The war ended in 
British victory and the signing of the first “unequal treaty” between 
China and a Westernized power.31  The subsequent series of treaties 
required China to give territory to Western powers for trading ports; 
pay financial reparations; and eliminate any Chinese-owned 
monopolies in favor of either free trade or European monopolies.32   
This new domination of China by European powers weakened 
the Qing government, and allowed rebellions to foment, including 
the catastrophic Taiping Rebellion, the Boxer Rebellion, and the 
Second Opium War.33  The Qing dynasty attempted to reform, as 
well as pay off its reparations and war debt, during this late period.34  
This is the backdrop to bonds such as the ‘4½% Gold Loan of 1898’, 
which were issued to pay Chinese reparations to Japan following 
the First Sino-Japanese War.35  The 1898 4½% Gold Loan has a 45 
year maturity, with interest paid monthly at 4.5% per year.36  The 
coupons are redeemable at either the Hong Kong and Shanghai 
Banking Corporation office in London, or the Deutsch-Asiatische 
Bank in Berlin, Hamburg, Frankfurt-am-Maine, and Cologne.37  
 
 30 See id. at 196–210. 
 31 See DONG WANG, CHINA’S UNEQUAL TREATIES: NARRATING NATIONAL HISTORY 
1–2 (2005). 
 32 This is how Hong Kong became a British territory.  See id. 
 33 The Taiping Rebellion alone resulted in an estimated 30 million deaths.  See 
STEPHEN R. PLATT, AUTUMN IN THE HEAVENLY KINGDOM: CHINA, THE WEST, AND THE EPIC 
STORY OF THE TAIPING CIVIL WAR (2012).   
 34 See ECKEL, supra note 13, at 272–80. 
 35 See Bond. No. 1898/3, Ger. (Deutsch-Asiatische Bank)-Gr. Brit. (Hongkong and 
Shanghai Banking Corp.)-China, art. 9, Agreement for the Chinese Imperial Government 
4½% Gold Loan of 1898 (Mar. 1, 1898), reprinted in TREATIES 1, supra note 22, at 110 
(“The Chinese Imperial Government hereby undertakes to pay the entire balance of the 
Indemnity due on the eighth day of May next to the Imperial Japanese Government out of 
the proceeds of this loan.”); Charles Denby, The National Debt of China—Its Origin and 
Its Security, 68 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 55, 58 (1916). 
 36 See Bond No. 1989/3, TREATIES 1, supra note 22, at 107–11 (describing the terms 
of the bond). 
 37 E.g., Deutsche-Asiatische Bank, Chinese Imperial Government 4½% Gold Loan 
of 1898 1 (Mar. 1, 1898) (bond contract) (on file with note author) [hereinafter 4½% Gold 
Loan of 1898].  The Deutsche-Asiatische Bank was founded in Shanghai by Deutsche 
Bank and twelve other German banks in 1889 to take advantage of Germany’s large excess 
capital from both “a war indemnity of 5 billion francs from France” after the Franco-
Prussian War and from rapid domestic industrial growth, and to finance “Chinese imperial 
loans and industries, especially mines and railways in the German concessions of China” 
such as Tsingtao, Hankou, and Tianjin.  ZHAOJIN JI, A HISTORY OF MODERN SHANGHAI 
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These bonds are secured by revenues from general lekins and salt 
lekins from seven different provinces (lekin or likin is a “Chinese 
provincial tax at inland stations on imports or articles in transit”).38  
As evidence of the “unequal treaties,” these revenues were collected 
by the Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs service, which was 
primarily operated by foreigners.39  Lastly, this bond had “priority, 
both as regards principal and interest, over all future loans, charges 
or mortgages, so long as this loan or any part thereof shall be 
unredeemed.”40 
Similar bonds are the ‘7% Silver Loan of 1894’ and ‘6% 
Sterling Loan of 1895’,41  also taken out to fund the war effort in the 
First Sino-Japanese War.42  The Silver Loan was paid through the 
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (the modern bank 
“HSBC”) by having the Imperial Government issue ‘Customs 
 
BANKING: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF CHINA’S FINANCIAL CAPITALISM 50 (2003).  Bank 
lending turned to focus on trade finance, which meant the bank suffered during the First 
World War as trade between Europe and Asia declined.  Ghassan Moazzin, From 
Globalization to Liquidation: The Deutsch-Asiatische Bank and the First World War in 
China, 16 CROSS-CURRENTS: E. ASIAN HIST. & CULTURAL REV. 52, 54 (2015).  When 
China joined the war effort on the side of the Allies against Germany and the Central 
Powers, Britain convinced China to liquidate the bank both as part of the war effort against 
Germany, and to cripple Germany’s growing threat to Britain’s future global economic 
dominance by ensuring “that the bank would be unable to resume business after the war.”  
Id. at 58.  All German businesses in China held their deposits at the Bank, and this blow 
to the Bank affected all German industry in China.  Id. at 68.  The Bank never fully 
recovered, and was quietly absorbed by Deutsche Bank in 1987.  Id. at 67; see also 
Deutsche Bank in East Asia, WAYBACK MACH.: INTERNET ARCHIVE (Dec. 29, 2008), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20081229232913/http://www.bankgeschichte.de/e/04_01_0 
1_01.html [https://perma.cc/BN43-GL5H]. 
 38 Bond No. 1989/3, art. 6(2), TREATIES 1, supra note 22, at 109; Likin, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/likin [https://perma.cc/4AZ7-
YGM9] (last visited Nov. 9, 2020). 
 39 Chihyun Chang, Modern China’s Customs Services: A Brief Introduction, 地理資
訊科學研究專題中心 [CTR. FOR GIS, RCHSS, ACADEMIA SINICA], 
http://gis.rchss.sinica.edu.tw/cmcs/modern-china%E2%80%99s-customs-services-a-
brief-introduction#p7 [https://perma.cc/LQ9Y-FYM4] (last visited Nov. 9, 2020). 
 40 Bond No. 1989/3, art. 6(2), TREATIES 1, supra note 22, at 109. 
 41 See generally Bond No. 1895/1, Gr. Brit. (Hongkong and Shanghai Banking 
Corp.)-China, Final Agreement for the Chinese Imperial Government Seven per Cent 
Silver Loan of 1894 (Jan. 26, 1895), reprinted in TREATIES 1, supra note 22, at 11–14; 
Bond No. 1895/2, Gr. Brit. (Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corp.)-China, Final 
Agreement for the Chinese Imperial Government Six per Cent Sterling Loan of 1895 (Jan. 
26, 1895), reprinted in TREATIES 1, supra note 22, at 15-17. 
 42 Denby, supra note 35, at 56–58. 
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Bonds’ to HSBC, which “assigns to and charges in favor of [HSBC] 
sufficient of the Customs Revenue at all or any [] ports  . . .  to meet 
and pay off all the Customs Bonds which have been handed to 
[HSBC]”, who would in turn pay the bondholders from the Customs 
revenue.43  This Silver Loan had no priority clause.44  However, the 
Sterling Loan had a priority clause with similar language to the Gold 
Loan of 1898.45   
On the eve of its collapse, the last imperial government in China, 
the Qing Dynasty, issued bonds to finance railway expansion and 
nationalization projects.46  The bonds were underwritten by a 
consortium of French, German, British and American banks.47  In a 
roughly contemporaneous assessment, the debt incurred was the 
first capital attracted for internal development.48  The railway bonds 
of this period generally did not share the same level of bondholder 
protection as the bonds discussed above.  For example, the ‘Chinese 
Imperial Railway 5% Gold Loan’ of 1911 for the construction of 
the Shanghai to Nanking railroad was secured by the railway, and 
any “land, materials, rolling-stock, buildings, property, and 
premises of every description purchased . . . by the railway[] 
hereinafter referred to, and on the last-mentioned railways 
themselves as and when constructed and on the revenue of all 
descriptions derivable therefrom.”49  The bond contains priority 
only over the security: “until [redemption], no part of the land 
comprised in the mortgage security or the railway and its 
appurtenances shall be transferred or given to another party, and that 
the rights of the first mortgage shall not in any way be impaired[.]”50   
 
 43 Bond No. 1895/1, art. 15, TREATIES 1, supra note 22, at 13. 
 44 See id. at 11–14. 
 45 Bond No. 1895/2, art. 9, TREATIES 1, supra note 22, at 16. 
 46 See Manman Huang, Hukuang Railway Bonds of 1911, FIN. HIST., Fall 2013, at 8-
9. 
 47 See, e.g., British & Chinese Corp., Ltd., Chinese Imperial Railway 5% Gold Loan 
for ₺3,250,000 Sterling 1 (Dec. 2, 1904) (bond contract) (on file with note author) 
[hereinafter 5% Gold Loan of 1911]. 
 48 Denby, supra note 35. 
 49 Bond No. 1903/2, Gr. Brit. (Brit. & Chinese Corp., Ltd.)-China, art. 3, Agreement 
for a Loan for the Construction of a Railway from Shanghai to Nanking (July 9, 1903), 
reprinted in TREATIES 1, supra note 22, at 389. 
 50 5% Gold Loan of 1911, supra note 47. 
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Republican Era Bonds 
Within months of the 1911 railway bond issue, a successful 
revolt against Qing rule was launched, culminating on January 1, 
1912, with the declaration of the Republic of China.51  In this 
turbulent period from 1912 to 1949, successive governments 
required foreign borrowing to manage perennial fiscal problems.52  
The Qing government was decisively overthrown on February 12, 
1912, during the Xinhai Revolution through an alliance between 
Sun Yat-sen’s Nationalist Party (the Kuomintang) and the de facto 
leader of the Beiyang army (the major Qing military force) Yuan 
Shikai.53  Shikai became a de facto dictator, even declaring himself 
emperor, from 1912 until his death in 1916.54  Many provinces 
declared their independence, until the establishment of the 
Nationalist government in Nanking in 1926, which had control over 
most of the country by 1928.55  The Nationalists achieved this 
degree of unification through the military venture known as the 
Northern Expedition.56  This period saw a degree of relative stability 
under the Nationalists, despite a war with the Communist party, up 
until the beginning of World War II, when Japan invaded China.57   
 
 51 The emperor and the royal family abdicated the throne in February of 1912.  The 
Chinese Revolution of 1911, U.S. DEP’T. OF STATE ARCHIVE, https://2001-
2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/ip/88116.htm [https://perma.cc/4E9T-LWKH] (last visited 
Nov. 9, 2020). 
 52 Governments in the period of Republican China struggled fiscally with chronic 
military and police expenditures, heavy debt service and indemnity payments, and 
inconsistent revenue sources.  Albert Feuerwerker, Economic Trends, 1912-49, in 12 THE 
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF CHINA: REPUBLICAN CHINA 1912-1949, PART 1 28, 100-05 (Denis 
Twitchett & John K. Fairbank eds., 1983) (“Between 1912 and 1926, 27 domestic bond 
issuances were floated by the Ministry of Finance . . . .”). 
 53 See Joseph W. Esherick, Introduction to CHINA: HOW THE EMPIRE FELL 1, 2–14 
(Joseph W. Esherick & C. Z. George Wei eds., Routledge 2014); Li Xizhu, Provincial 
Officials in 1911-12: Their Backgrounds and Reactions to Revolution—An Inquiry into the 
Structure of “Weak Center, Weak Regions” in the Late Qing, in CHINA: HOW THE EMPIRE 
FELL, supra, at 159–76. 
 54 See, e.g., Esherick, supra note 53, at 3–4, 6. 
 55 See THE GENERALISSIMO: CHIANG KAI-SHEK AND THE STRUGGLE FOR MODERN 
CHINA 54–63, 77–105 (Jay Taylor ed., Harvard Univ. Press 2009) (1931). 
 56 See id. at 49–96. 
 57 See, e.g., Introduction to 9 THE STRENUOUS DECADE: CHINA’S NATION-BUILDING 
EFFORTS, 1927-1937 ix, x–xvii (Paul K. T. Sih ed., St. John’s Univ. Press 1970); Dison H. 
Poe, Political Reconstruction, 1927-1937, in 9 THE STRENUOUS DECADE: CHINA’S 
NATION-BUILDING EFFORTS, 1927-1937, supra, at 33, 73–79; Arthur N. Young, China’s 
Fiscal Transformation, 1927-1937, in 9 THE STRENUOUS DECADE: CHINA’S NATION-
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In the last month of the Xinhai Revolution, the Provisional 
Government issued the “8% Military Loan of the Republic of 
China.”58  The purpose of the bond was “for military emergencies 
and the preservation of peace and order[,]” and all proceeds from 
the issuance were limited to that use.59  This bond was secured by 
tax revenues on grain.60  The bond matured in six years, but required 
redemption within two years after maturity or the bond expired.61  
The coupons expired within six months.62   
As the situation settled, the new government issued bonds in 
Belgium63  and Great Britain.64  These issuances were “designed to 
provide funds . . . to consolidate the Central and Local 
Governments, to assure the satisfactory administration of the State 
and Provinces and/or to relieve the distress prevailing among the 
people and in commercial circles.”65  The issuances have some 
different terms: for instance, the British issue granted the 
bondholder priority only over any bond “charged on the [same] 
revenue[,]” which was revenues from the Salt Tax.66  The Belgian 
bond was not protected by such explicit guarantees.67   
 
BUILDING EFFORTS, 1927-1937, supra, at 83, 120–21; Theodore H. Chen, Education in 
China, 1927-1937, in 9 THE STRENUOUS DECADE: CHINA’S NATION-BUILDING EFFORTS, 
1927-1937, supra, at 289, 291–94. 
 58 Bond No. 1912/1, China, Regulations for the 8% Military Loan of the Republic of 
China (Jan. 8, 1912), reprinted in TREATIES 2, supra note 22, at 929-31. 
 59 Id. at 929 (quoting Article 5). 
 60 Id. at 930 (referring to Article 16, which states “The security for this loan shall be 
the grain tax of the nation”). 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. (referring to Article 18). 
 63 Bond No. 1912/4, Belg. (Banque Sino-Belge)-China, Agreement for the Chinese 
Government Five per Cent Gold Loan of 1912 (Mar. 14, 1912), reprinted in TREATIES 2, 
supra note 22, at 947-50.  
 64 Bond No. 1912/9, Gr. Brit. (G. Birch Crisp & Co.)-China, Agreement for the 
Chinese Government Five per Cent Gold Loan of 1912, reprinted in TREATIES 2, supra 
note 22, at 967-73. 
 65 Bond No. 1912/4, art. 2, TREATIES 2, supra note 22, at 948; see also Bond No. 
1912/9, art. 2, TREATIES 2, supra note 22, at 968 (“The Loan [with Great Britain] [wa]s 
designed to provide capital for the repayment of existing loans and for the reorganization 
of the Government and for productive works.”). 
 66 Bond No. 1912/9, art. 4(5), TREATIES 2, supra note 22, at 968-69. 
 67 Bond No. 1912/4, Belg. (Banque Sino-Belge)-China, Agreement for the Chinese 
Government Five per Cent Gold Loan of 1912 (Mar. 14, 1912), reprinted in TREATIES 2, 
supra note 22, at 947-50. 
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The new government also issued bonds to help fund 
infrastructure projects like railroads and canals.68  The author of this 
work was unable to find any bond contract terms for post-1919 
bonds.  However, this paper is still relevant to those bonds.  The 
Concluding Framework outlines the type of bond terms required 
that are more amenable to suit, and post-1919 bond terms can be 
compared with the terms amenable to suit.69   
B. The PRC Succession to Power, Default and Non-Payment 
On September 21, 1949, after a revolutionary struggle lasting 
dozens of years, Chairman Mao proclaimed the PRC, whereupon 
his new government defaulted on all bonds issued during the 
Imperial and Nationalist eras.70  To announce the rejection of any 
obligations incurred by the Imperial or Nationalist governments, the 
new government issued a communique in 1955 to foreign 
governments that “the PRC had not the ability to pay [the pre-1949] 
debt burden[.]”71  The PRC wrote an aide memoire to the U.S. State 
Department “asserting that the PRC should have no obligation to 
pay th[ose] debts[.]”72  Unsurprisingly, the government of Taiwan, 
who claims to be the legitimate continuation of the Republic of 
China, believes the PRC is liable for the debt.73   
C. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission 
American bondholders sought to collect on this debt under the 
International Claims Settlement Act of 1949 (“ICSA”).74  In 1970, 
the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (“FCSC”) considered a 
 
 68 See, e.g., id; Bond No. 1912/9, TREATIES 2, supra note 22, at 967-73. 
 69 See infra Parts II & III. 
 70 RADHEY S. CHAURASIA, HISTORY OF MODERN CHINA 197-98, 314 (Atlantic 
Publishers & Distribs. 2004); China, Britain Settle Claims, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1987, at 
D9, https://www.nytimes.com/1987/06/08/business/china-britain-settle-claims.html [https 
://perma.cc/8Z4L-AV79]. 
 71 See H.R. Con. Res. 160, 110th Cong. (2007) (recommending that the PRC be 
denied access to U.S. capital markets until it complies with the WTO Agreement terms 
and conditions and honors its outstanding defaulted public debts owed to U.S. citizens). 
 72 See id. 
 73 Keoni Everington, Taiwan Not Required to Pay Qing Dynasty Bonds, China Is: 
Former Premier, TAIWAN NEWS (Sept. 10, 2019), https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/ 
en/news/3773698 [https://perma.cc/B42B-XLXG]. 
 74 See generally 22 U.S.C. § 1621 et seq. (codified text of the International Claims 
Settlement Act of 1949 (“ICSA”]). 
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claim to recuperate the pre-1949 debt using the ICSA.75  However, 
the FCSC concluded in Decision No. CN-147 that the Act only 
covered claims for losses suffered against the Government of the 
PRC, and because the bonds had been in default ten years prior to 
the Communist assumption of power, the claims were not covered.76  
The ICSA granted the FCSC the ‘final word’ on claims: “[t]he 
action of the Commission in allowing or denying any claim . . . shall 
be final and conclusive on all questions of law and fact and not 
subject to review by . . . any court[.]”77  Because the pre-1949 bond 
claims were not covered by the ICSA, the legal obligations owed on 
those bonds were not extinguished under U.S. law. 
D. China Enters the Global Capital Market 
Because the bonds were not extinguished by the FCSC and 
ICSA, the PRC was constrained by bondholders when it attempted 
to gain access to Western capital markets.  As China pursued market 
reforms in the late 1970s, it was desperate for foreign capital to fund 
development.78  China first opened up Special Economic Zones to 
encourage foreign investment on the Chinese mainland.79  To access 
the British bond market, China negotiated a deal with the British 
government in 1986 to settle with British bondholders of old 
Chinese bonds.80  In March of 1987, the U.S. Supreme Court denied 
certiorari in Jackson v. People’s Republic of China,81  an Eleventh 
Circuit decision which dismissed a suit by an American holder of 
pre-1949 Chinese bonds.82  The same month, the Bank of China was 
able to borrow $150 million from a U.S. lender.83  To China, the old 
 
 75 See generally Complaint, Harper, No. 5:18-cv-00436. 
 76 Id. at 4. 
 77 22 U.S.C. § 1623(h). 
 78 See IMF, CHINA’S GROWTH AND INTEGRATION INTO THE WORLD ECONOMY: 
PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES 1 (2004), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ 
ft/op/232/op232.pdf [https://perma.cc/AZA2-6PXA]. 
 79 See id. at 2, 52. 
 80 China, Britain Settle Claims, supra note 70. 
 81 794 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 917 (1987). 
 82 See generally id. (dismissing on the argument that the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act of 1976 did not apply retroactively; the U.S. Supreme Court reversed this 
in Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004), discussed infra); China, Britain 
Settle Claims, supra note 70. 
 83 Settlement of Bond Issue Clears Way: China Again Borrowing Money in U.S. After 
38 Years, L.A. TIMES (May 26, 1987) https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1987-05-
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debt was where it belonged: in history. 
III. Jurisdiction in United States Federal Courts 
In Jackson v. People’s Republic of China, the Eleventh Circuit 
dismissed the claims against the PRC based on lack of jurisdiction.84  
This Section explains how this decision was incorrect and that a 
district court could have jurisdiction over the PRC in a pre-1949 
bond case. 
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction over Foreign Sovereigns 
A threshold question for a plaintiff seeking to recover on pre-
1949 bonds is whether federal courts have subject matter 
jurisdiction over China.85  The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
of 1976 (“FSIA”) confers jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign.86  
The law has evolved over time to favor bondholders. 
1. Schooner Exchange and Absolute Immunity 
The U.S. Supreme Court first considered the doctrine of foreign 
sovereign immunity in 1812 in the case of The Schooner Exchange 
v. McFaddon.87  The Schooner Exchange (the “Exchange”) was a 
merchant schooner owned by two Marylanders, who in 1809 sent 
the ship on a voyage to Spain.88  A year later the ship was seized by 
Napoleon and converted into a French warship.89  When the ship 
was required to put in for repairs in Philadelphia, the Maryland 
owners tried to reclaim the ship.90  The district court dismissed on 
jurisdictional grounds and the circuit court reversed.91  On appeal to 
the Supreme Court, the Court considered “whether an American 
citizen can assert, in an American court, a title to [property of a 
foreign sovereign].”92   
 
26-fi-2786-story.html [https://perma.cc/9GB8-K2JN]. 
 84 See id. 
 85 See, e.g., Jackson, 794 F.2d at 1491–92. 
 86 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (“FSIA”), 28 U.S.C.§§ 1330, 1332, 
1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611. 
 87 11 U.S. 116 (1812). 
 88 Id. at 117. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. at 119–20. 
 92 Id. at 136. 
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U.S. Attorney General William Pinkney93  argued that complete 
sovereign immunity was a long-standing convention of 
international law, stretching as far back as the Iron Age Phoenician 
merchant-cities of Tyre and Sidon.94  Chief Justice John Marshall, 
using his characteristic syllogistic reasoning, determined that: (1) 
“[t]he jurisdiction of courts is a branch of . . . a nation[’s] 
independent sovereign power”; (2) any exception “to the full and 
complete power of a nation within its own territories, must be traced 
to the [explicit or implicit] consent of the nation itself”; (3) the 
world consists of “distinct sovereignties, possessing equal rights 
and equal independence”; and (4) to further the “common interest 
[of] mutual intercourse, and an interchange of good offices with 
each other[,]” sovereigns consent to waive their exclusive 
jurisdiction in favor of another.95  Chief Justice Marshall thus found 
that the Court did not have jurisdiction over the French warship 
because the international convention was for sovereigns to waive 
jurisdiction over entities of other sovereigns (e.g., ambassadors, 
armies, and ships in the service of the sovereign power) to promote 
comity between the two sovereigns, and the political branches had 
not acted contrariwise.96   
While the Schooner Exchange case was narrowly about foreign 
warships, “that opinion came to be regarded as extending virtually 
absolute immunity to foreign sovereigns.”97  For example, in Berizzi 
Bros. Co. v. The Pesaro,98  the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
Schooner Exchange also applied to merchant ships owned and 
operated by a foreign sovereign.99  An important component of this 
precedent was that the grant of immunity to foreign sovereigns was 
itself an act of the sovereign,100  and the sovereign was free to 
 
 93 William Pinkney ratified the U.S. Constitution as an elected delegate of the 
Maryland Constitutional Convention.  WILLIAM PINKNEY, THE LIFE OF WILLIAM PINKNEY, 
BY HIS NEPHEW 17 (Adamant Media Corp. 2005) (1853). 
 94 Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. at 134. 
 95 Id. at 136–37 (clarifying that a nation’s consent could be implicit). 
 96 Id. at 137–43. 
 97 Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983) (citing Berizzi 
Bros. Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926)). 
 98 271 U.S. 562 (1926). 
 99 See id. at 573–74, 576. 
 100 Only a sovereign can waive the right to enforce sovereign power on the 
sovereign’s territory. See Berizzi Bros. Co., 271 U.S. at 573–74. 
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enforce its sovereign prerogative if it so chose.101  Chief Justice 
Burger explained this in Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria: 
The Schooner Exchange made clear[] [that] foreign sovereign 
immunity is a matter of grace and comity on the part of the United 
States, and not a restriction imposed by the Constitution. 
Accordingly, [the U.S. Supreme] Court consistently has deferred 
to the decisions of the political branches—in particular, those of 
the Executive Branch—on whether to take jurisdiction over 
actions against foreign sovereigns and their instrumentalities.102 
Tate Letter and Restrictive Immunity 
On May 19, 1952, the Acting Legal Adviser to the State 
Department, Jack B. Tate, signed a letter (the “Tate Letter” or the 
“Letter”) addressed to the Acting Attorney General, Philip B. 
Perlman,103  with a self-explanatory title: “Changed Policy 
Concerning the Granting of Sovereign Immunity to Foreign 
Governments.”104  The Tate Letter reveals that the State Department 
had “for sometime [been] consider[ing] the question [of] whether 
the practice of the Government[,] in granting immunity from suit to 
foreign governments made [] defendant[s] without their consent[,] 
should not be changed.”105  According to Tate’s research, there were 
two competing theories of sovereign immunity: (1) absolute 
sovereign immunity, in which “a sovereign cannot, without his 
consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign” 
and (2) restrictive sovereign immunity, where “immunity is 
recognized with regard to sovereign or public acts (jure imperii) of 
a state, but not with respect to private acts (jure gestionis).”106  At 
the time it was written, the Tate Letter estimated that the United 
States, the British Empire, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Poland, Brazil, 
Chile, Hungary, Japan, Luxembourg, Norway, and Portugal 
subscribed to absolute immunity; the Netherlands, Sweden, and 
Argentina had begun to transition towards restrictive immunity; the 
 
 101 See id.; see also Verlinden B.V., 461 U.S. at 486, 488. 
 102 Verlinden B.V., 461 U.S. at 486. 
 103 See generally Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Dep’t of State, to 
Philip B. Perlman, Acting Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Just., Changed Policy Concerning the 
Granting of Sovereign Immunity to Foreign Governments (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 
DEPT. ST. BULL. 984 [hereinafter Tate Letter]. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. 
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German Supreme Court was waiting for the doctrine of restrictive 
immunity to develop further; and Belgium, Italy, Egypt, 
Switzerland, France, Austria, Greece, Romania, Peru, and Denmark 
had adopted the restrictive immunity theory.107 
Only a few years after the 1926 Berizzi Bros. decision, ten of the 
absolute immunity countries “ratified the Brussels Convention of 
1926 under which immunity for government owned merchant 
vessels is waived.”108  Indeed, by the time of the Tate letter, the 
United States, while not a signatory to the Brussels convention, had 
adopted “a policy of not claiming immunity for its public owned or 
operated merchant vessels.”109  Tate’s research indicated to him that 
the global trend was leaning towards restrictive immunity, with the 
Soviet Union being the only great power fighting against the move, 
protesting lawsuits over Tsarist-era bonds and contracts.110  The 
Letter concludes that “the widespread and increasing practice on the 
part of governments of engaging in commercial activities” and “the 
granting of sovereign immunity to foreign governments in the 
[United States] courts . . . is [] inconsistent with the action of the 
Government of the United States in subjecting itself to suit in these 
same courts in both contract and tort and with its long established 
policy of not claiming immunity in foreign jurisdictions for its 
merchant vessels.”111  Tate acknowledged that the Letter itself had 
no direct legal impact, but understood that “the courts are less likely 
to allow a plea of sovereign immunity where the executive has 
declined to do so.”112   
Regarding sovereign immunity in domestic matters, John 
Marshall once held “that when a government becomes a partner in 
any trading company, it devests itself, so far as concerns the 
transactions of that country, of its sovereign character, and takes that 
of a private citizen.”113  In practice, the Tate Letter meant the United 
States had withdrawn its consent from exempting commercial 
 
 107 China in this case is likely meant to refer to the Republic of China.  See id. 
 108 Id. at 985. 
 109 Tate Letter, supra note 103, at 985. 
 110 Tate mentions that the United Kingdom is still in support of absolute sovereignty, 
but that there “are evidences that British authorities are aware of its deficiencies and ready 
for a change.”  Id. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Bank of the U.S. v. Planters’ Bank of Ga., 22 U.S. 904, 907 (1824). 
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activities of foreign sovereigns from American territorial 
jurisdiction and began treating them as “a private citizen.” 
Lead Up to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 
1976 
Even though the Tate Letter indicated that the executive branch 
had shifted to the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, there 
was no legislative action to codify the decision: courts facing 
foreign sovereign immunity questions had to look for guidance from 
the State Department.114  Monroe Leigh, a legal adviser to the U.S. 
State Department, described the result as a “peculiar and, in my 
view, outdated practice of having a political institution, namely, the 
State Department, decide many of these questions of law.”115  In his 
testimony before the Subcommittee on Administrative Law and 
Governmental Relations of the House Judiciary Committee, Leigh 
described the process of suing a foreign sovereign: 
Under our current system, after a foreign-state defendant raises 
the defense of sovereign immunity, it has an option: either the 
foreign state can litigate this legal defense entirely in court, or, as 
is more usually the case, it can make a formal diplomatic request 
to have the State Department decide the issue. 
If it does the latter, and if the State Department believes that 
immunity is appropriate, the State Department asks the 
Department of Justice to file a “suggestion of immunity” with the 
court hearing the case.116 
In 1943, the Supreme Court held that once a court received this 
“suggestion of immunity” from the State Department, the court 
must accept such “as a conclusive determination by the political arm 
of the Government that the continued [legal action] interferes with 
the proper conduct of our foreign relations.”117  After the State 
 
 114 See Verlinden B.V., 461 U.S. at 487. 
 115 Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Admin. L. and Governmental Rels. of the H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary on 
H.R. 11315, 94th Cong. 24–29 (1976) (statement of Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser, Dep’t 
of State, accompanied by Michael Sandler, Legal Adviser’s Officer, Dep’t of State) 
[hereinafter FSIA Hearings]. 
 116 Id. at 26. 
 117 Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 589 (1943); see also FSIA Hearings, 
supra note 115, at 26 (“Under the Supreme Court’s decision in Ex Parte Peru, which was 
decided in 1943, U.S. courts to automatically defer to such suggestions of immunity from 
the executive branch.”). 
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Department adopted the restrictive immunity theory in the Tate 
Letter, it had to determine whether specific actions of a foreign 
sovereign brought in district courts were jure imperii or jure 
gestionis. 
By the 1970s, the majority of countries had adopted the 
restrictive theory of immunity in full, where international sovereign 
immunity defenses were “decided exclusively by the courts and not 
by institutions concerned with foreign affairs.”118  This asymmetry 
between U.S. courts and foreign courts created a competitive 
disadvantage for the United States and for Americans engaged in 
commercial endeavors with foreign sovereigns.119  The United 
States would always be liable for suit under the restrictive theory in 
foreign courts, whereas foreign powers could have an “ordinary 
legal dispute . . . artificially raised to the level of a diplomatic 
problem through the [foreign] government’s intercession with the 
State Department.”120  Similarly, there was market certainty in 
contracting with foreign governments for individuals living in 
countries with restrictive immunity, whereas U.S. citizens risked 
having a foreign sovereign violate a contract and escape liability by 
lobbying the State Department.121 
The FSIA 
On October 21, 1976, President Gerald Ford signed the FSIA 
into law.122  The FSIA officially codified the restrictive theory of 
sovereign immunity into U.S. law.123  Congress passed the law “in 
order to free the Government from the case-by-case diplomatic 
pressures, to clarify the governing standards, and to ‘assur[e] 
litigants that  . . .  decisions are made on purely legal grounds and 
under procedures that insure due process[.]’”124   
Broadly, the FSIA extends a blanket immunity from the 
 
 118 FSIA Hearings, supra note 115, at 27. 
 119 See id. 
 120 Id. 
 121 See id. 
 122 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332, 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611; see also Actions 
Overview: H.R. 11315 – 94th Congress (1975-1976), CONGRESS.GOV, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/94th-congress/house-bill/11315/actions 
[https://perma.cc/ZS25-QR7H] (last visited Jan. 17, 2021). 
 123 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605. 
 124 Verlinden B.V., 461 U.S. at 488 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94–1487, at 7 (1976)) 
(alteration and omission in original). 
408 N.C. J. INT'L L. [Vol. XLVI 
jurisdiction of federal and state courts.125  But the statute lists a 
number of exceptions.126  Pre-1949 bondholders can avail 
themselves of one of these exceptions, such as the “commercial 
activity exception” for actions based “upon an act outside the 
territory of the United States in connection with a commercial 
activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct 
effect in the United States[.]”127  Any claim which can be brought 
under FSIA § 1605 (the FSIA’s exceptions to sovereign immunity) 
can also be brought as a counterclaim.128  If an exception applies, 
then “the foreign state shall be liable in the same manner and to the 
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances[.]”129  
While foreign sovereigns can be brought into either state or federal 
court,130  foreign states have the right to remove any civil action to 
federal court.131   
B. The Applicability of the FSIA Commercial Activity 
Exception to Pre-1949 Bonds 
The commercial activity exception lists three acts which grant 
federal and state courts jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign: (1) an 
act that “is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the 
United States by the foreign state;” (2) “an act performed in the 
United States in connection with a commercial activity of the 
foreign state elsewhere;” and (3) “an act outside the territory of the 
United States in connection with a commercial activity of the 
foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the 
United States[.]”132  For sovereign bonds, the commercial activity is 
the issuance of the bonds.133  For holders of pre-1949 bonds, the act 
which causes injury is breach of the bond contract.134  As will be 
 
 125 See 28 U.S.C. § 1604. 
 126 See id. § 1605. 
 127 Two other clauses in § 1605(a)(2) seem less likely to apply: where “the action is 
based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or 
upon an act performed in the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the 
foreign state elsewhere. . . .” Id. § 1605(a)(2). 
 128 See id. § 1607. 
 129 Id. § 1606. 
 130 See id. § 1604. 
 131 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d). 
 132 Id. § 1605(a)(2). 
 133 See Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 615–16 (1992). 
 134 See, e.g., id. at 620. 
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discussed further in this Part, the determination of which of the three 
exceptions apply to pre-1949 bondholders depends on where the 
bonds were issued and the nature of the breach of contract.135  Each 
of the elements of this statutory requirement is considered below, as 
well as the question of whether the FSIA applies to claims arising 
before the Act was passed in 1976. 
1. What is a “Foreign State”? 
The PRC should be considered a “foreign state” for the purposes 
of the FSIA.  However, the Act does not define the term “foreign 
state.”136  The legislative history of the FSIA shows that Congress 
intended to “transfer the determination of sovereign immunity from 
the executive branch to the judicial branch[.]”137  The “decisions on 
claims by foreign states to sovereign immunity are best made by the 
judiciary . . . incorporat[ing] standards recognized under 
international law.”138  Thus, U.S. courts have the discretion to make 
the determination of whether a state is a “foreign state” for the 
purposes of the Act, as long as the decision tracks international 
law.139   
The Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the 
United States defines a “state” as “an entity that has a defined 
territory and population under the control of a government and that 
engages in foreign relations.”140  The Second Circuit, combining 
Supreme Court precedents and the Restatement (Third) of Foreign 
Relations Law of the United States, adopted the following 
 
 135 See infra Section II.B. 
 136 The Act states that “foreign state” “includes a political subdivision of a foreign 
state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state” yet does not define “foreign state.”  
See 28 U.S.C. § 1603.   
 137 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 7 (1976). 
 138 Id. at 14. 
 139 See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 452 n.1 (A. L. I. 2018). 
 140 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 4 
(A.L.I. 1965); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 201 (A.L.I. 1987) (“[A] state is an entity that has a defined territory and a 
permanent population under the control of its own government, and that engages in, or has 
the capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such entities.”); RESTATEMENT 
(FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 452 cmt. a (A.L.I. 2018) 
(“[S]tates are generally understood as sovereign independent entities that have a permanent 
population, a defined territory, a government, and the capacity to enter into relations with 
other states.”). 
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definitions: 
[S]overeign statehood [includes] the power to declare and wage 
war; to conclude peace; to maintain diplomatic ties with other 
sovereigns; to acquire territory by discovery and occupation; and 
to make international agreements and treaties.  Under 
international law, a state is said to be an entity possessed of a 
defined territory and a permanent population, controlled by its 
own government, and engaged in or capable of engaging in 
relations with other such entities.141 
Based on the above definitions, it seems evident that the PRC is 
a “state” for purposes of the FSIA.  What if a state meets these 
requirements, but is not recognized as a state by the political 
branches of the government, as was the case with the PRC until 
1970?  The Restatement (Third) states that “an entity not recognized 
as a state, or a regime not recognized as the government of a state, 
is ordinarily denied access to courts in the United States[.]”142  
However, this only prohibits an unrecognized state from being a 
plaintiff in U.S. courts, and even this prohibition can be lifted 
(without recognition of the state by the government) at the behest of 
the political branches.143   
Pre-Tate Letter, courts granted sovereign immunity to 
unrecognized states as defendants.144  The Court of Appeals of New 
York held that, even though unrecognized as a state, the Russian 
Socialist Federative Soviet Republic was “an existing government 
sovereign within its own territories.”145  The court reasoned that 
“‘[t]o cite a foreign potentate into a municipal court for any 
complaint against him in his public capacity is contrary to the law 
of nations and an insult which he is entitled to resent[,]’”146  and that 
“[s]uch is not the proper method of redress if a citizen of the United 
 
 141 Morgan Guar. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. Republic of Palau, 924 F.2d 1237, 1243 (2d Cir. 
1991) (citing United States v. Curitss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318–19 (1936); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 201 (A.L.I. 
1987). 
 142 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 
205(1) (A.L.I. 1987). 
 143 See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 408–12 (1964); Nat’l 
Petrochemical Co. v. M/T Stolt Sheaf, 860 F.2d 551, 553–54 (2d Cir. 1988). 
 144 Wulfsohn v. Russ. Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, 234 N.Y. 372, 374–76 
(1923). 
 145 Id. at 376. 
 146 Id. (quoting De Haber v. Queen of Portugal (1851) 117 Eng. Rep. 1255). 
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States is wronged.  The question is a political one, not confided to 
the courts, but to another department of government.”147   
It is unclear how a court would have dealt with an unrecognized 
state defendant after the Tate Letter or after the passage of the FSIA.  
It seems altogether easier for a court and the government to dismiss 
a case against an unrecognized state when the law of the land is 
absolute sovereign immunity; but when an unrecognized foreign 
sovereign is liable for commercial actions, it puts the court and the 
government in a trickier situation regarding service of process, 
execution of court orders, etc. 
The United States has by statute granted certain unrecognized 
states the same legal rights and liabilities as a recognized sovereign: 
for instance, the Taiwan Relations Act allows Taiwan to sue and be 
sued in domestic courts.148 
2. What is a “Commercial Activity”? 
China’s bond issuances constitute a “commercial activity.” 
“Commercial activity” is defined as “either a regular course of 
commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or 
act.”149  “[C]ommercial activity carried on in the United States by a 
foreign state” is defined as “commercial activity carried on by such 
state and having substantial contact with the United States.”150  An 
evaluating court determines whether an activity is commercial by 
“reference to the nature of the . . . act, rather than by reference to its 
purpose.”151   
For the purposes of the FSIA, courts have consistently 
determined that sovereign bond issuances are a commercial 
activity.152  The Supreme Court examines whether an activity is 
“commercial” based on the “nature” of the activity.153  Because 
private parties, as well as governments, issue bonds “to raise 
capital[,] finance purchases, [or] refinance debt[,]”154  the activity is 
the “type of action[] by which a private party engages in ‘trade and 
 
 147 Id. 
 148 22 U.S.C. §§ 3301–3316. 
 149 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d). 
 150 Id. § 1603(e). 
 151 Id. § 1603(d). 
 152 E.g., Weltover, 504 U.S. at 615–17. 
 153 Id. at 615. 
 154 Id. at 616. 
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traffic or commerce[.]’”155  The Supreme Court has thus concluded 
that “issuance of [bonds is] a ‘commercial activity’ under the 
FSIA.”156   
3. What is a “Direct Effect”? 
The “direct effect” requirement is the most nuanced and difficult 
challenge a plaintiff is likely to face.157  The Act does not define the 
term “direct effect.”158  If an action by a foreign state upon which a 
claim is brought happens outside the United States, the “commercial 
activity” exception to sovereign immunity will only apply where the 
act is “in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state 
elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United 
States[.]”159   
Similar to how “United States v. Aluminum Co. of America 
(Alcoa)160  extended the territorial jurisdiction principle to include 
effects within the United States, regardless of origin” by allowing 
American antitrust laws to reach foreign nationals when there were 
“‘substantial,’ ‘material,’ or ‘direct’ effects” on the United States,161  
this “direct effect” clause of the FSIA commercial activity 
exception allows plaintiffs to sue foreign sovereigns in United 
States courts when “direct effects” from foreign actions is found.162  
Unlike federal antitrust law, however, the commercial exception in 
the FSIA does not “contain[] any unexpressed requirement of 
‘substantiality’ or ‘foreseeability.’”163   
In Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.,164  Argentina had 
“unilateral[ly] rescehdul[ed the] maturity dates” on bonds held by 
 
 155 Id. at 614 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)). 
 156 Id. at 617. 
 157 “Fourteen years after the FSIA was enacted, the circuits remain divided on how to 
interpret the direct effects clause.”  Hadwin A. Card III, Interpreting the Direct Effects 
Clause of the FSIA’s Commercial Activity Exception, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 91, 91 (1990). 
 158 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).  The Act mentions that a foreign state “includes a 
political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state[,]” 
but does not define “foreign state.”  Id. § 1603. 
 159 Id. § 1605(a)(2). 
 160 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
 161 Charles T. Plambeck, Holding the Antitrust Line: Laker Airways v. Sabena, 
Belgian World Airlines, 10 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 251, 256, 257 n.41 (1985). 
 162 See id. 
 163 Weltover, 504 U.S. at 618; see also Plambeck, supra note 161, at 257 n.41. 
 164 504 U.S. 607 (1992). 
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the plaintiffs.165  The plaintiffs were two Panamanian corporations 
and a Swiss bank who had “declined to accept the rescheduling and 
insisted on repayment in New York.”166  The plaintiffs sued for 
breach of contract.167  The Supreme Court “reject[ed] Argentina’s 
suggestion that the ‘direct effect’ requirement cannot be satisfied 
where the plaintiffs are all foreign corporations with no other 
connections to the United States[,]” and that because the plaintiffs 
“had designated their accounts in New York as the place of 
payment, and Argentina made some interest payments into those 
accounts before announcing that it was rescheduling the 
payments[,] the rescheduling of those obligations necessarily had a 
‘direct effect’ in [the United States.]”168  Quite simply, “[m]oney 
that was supposed to have been delivered to a New York bank for 
deposit was not forthcoming.”169 
Hanil Bank v. PT. Bank Negara Indonesia (Persero)170  further 
emphasized that even where “the letter of credit did not itself 
specify New York as the place of payment . . . when [plaintiff] 
specified New York in its correspondence, [defendant] had already 
impliedly agreed to New York as place of payment.”171  The Second 
Circuit summarized the direct effect requirement regarding 
breaches of contract: “[e]very circuit court of which we are aware 
that has addressed this issue has held  . . . that an anticipatory 
contractual breach occurs ‘in the United States’ for [the FSIA] 
purposes if performance could have been required in the United 
States and then was requested there.”172 
An illustrative case, Morris v. People’s Republic of China, 
concerning, incidentally, pre-1949 Chinese bonds was dismissed 
because of the lack of “direct effects” in the United States.173  The 
 
 165 Id. at 618. 
 166 Id. at 607. 
 167 Id. 
 168 Id. at 619. 
 169 Weltover, 504 U.S. at 619. 
 170 148 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 171 Id. at 132. 
 172 Virtual Countries, Inc. v. Republic of South Africa, 300 F.3d 230, 239 (2d Cir. 
2002). 
 173 See Morris v. People’s Republic of China, 478 F.Supp. 2d 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 
(holding that the criterion of direct effects was unmet both for the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act and for commercial activity in the United States); see also Jackson, 794 
F.2d 1490 (dismissing on the grounds that the FSIA was not retroactive); Altmann, 541 
414 N.C. J. INT'L L. [Vol. XLVI 
plaintiffs were individuals “seeking to recover on defaulted bonds 
issued by the PRC’s predecessor government in 1913.”174  The PRC 
moved to dismiss, in part on the grounds that the PRC had sovereign 
immunity because the commercial activity exception did not apply 
in this case.175  The plaintiff argued the third prong of the 
commercial activity exception applied: where a foreign sovereign 
commits an act abroad, in connection with commercial activity 
abroad, that has a direct effect in the United States.176 
The court determined that the commercial activity exception did 
not apply, and, thus, the PRC had sovereign immunity, because the 
plaintiff “has not made a showing of a ‘direct effect’ as required by 
the statute.”177  First, the court noted that the plaintiff “purchased his 
bonds over sixty years after the PRC’s predecessor government 
defaulted in 1939 and forty years after the bonds matured[,]” 
consequently lacking the “immediacy required[.]”178  The court 
determined that the “act of purchasing the bonds many decades after 
default [ . . . ] is an intervening act breaking the causal 
relationship.”179  The plaintiff was not harmed because “the legally 
significant acts . . .  [were] felt in 1939 and 1960, not in 2000 when 
the plaintiff purchased and [sic] the defaulted bonds in a 
‘collectibles’ market.”180   
However, the court stated that “[n]othing in the commercial 
activity exception expressly limits cognizable effects to those felt 
solely by plaintiff.  Thus, plaintiff could arguably rely on the effect 
felt by the former holders of his bonds.”181  If the plaintiff could 
have proven that at one point the default had a direct effect in the 
United States through the previous holders, then the court could find 
a direct effect; unfortunately, the plaintiff never put forward any 
evidence to this effect.182   
 
U.S. 677 (holding that the FSIA is retroactive). 
 174 Morris, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 563. 
 175 Id. at 565–66. 
 176 Id. at 563; 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). 
 177 Morris, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 568. 
 178 Id. 
 179 Id.  
 180 Id. at 568–69. 
 181 Id. at 569. 
 182 Id. at 569 n.12 (citing Commercial Bank of Kuwait v. Rafidain Bank, 15 F.3d 238 
(2d Cir. 1994) (holding that failure to remit funds to third-party banks in New York had a 
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Factors which the court would have considered to have 
implicated a direct effect include: (1) “prior ownership of plaintiff’s 
bonds by U.S. citizens or corporations at the time of any default”; 
(2) whether “issuing banks were located in the United States”; (3) 
whether “[t]he bonds were [] issued or payable in U.S. currency”; 
(4) whether the PRC had a “designated agent to administer the 
bonds in the United States”; (5) whether “negotiations concerning 
the bond issuance or payment occurred within the United States”; 
and (6) “importantly, [where] the contractually designated locations 
where payments of principal and interest were to be paid[.]”183   
Because (1) plaintiff never showed evidence of prior ownership 
of the bond; (2) plaintiff’s bonds were not issued to American banks 
and there were no designated locations or negotiations in the United 
States; and (3) the bonds were not in U.S. dollars, the court found 
that plaintiff did not suffer a direct effect in the United States.184   
4. Retroactivity 
China should not be able to assert absolute immunity under the 
pre-FSIA sovereign immunity doctrine, because the FSIA 
effectively is retroactive.  In 2004, the Supreme Court heard 
Republic of Austria v. Altmann.185  The plaintiff had discovered that 
“her uncle’s valuable art works had either been seized by the Nazis 
or expropriated by Austria after World War II,” and she filed suit to 
recover said art.186  Plaintiff sued under the FSIA, and Austria 
moved to dismiss on the grounds that when the art was taken, the 
United States still followed the theory of absolute immunity, and 
“nothing in the FSIA retroactively divests [Austria] of that 
immunity.”187   
The Supreme Court disagreed.188  The Court found that 
Congress intended for the FSIA to create conformity in regard to 
 
direct effect in the United States)); see also Weltover, Inc. v. Republic of Argentina, 941 
F.2d 145, 152 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Because defendants’ breach of the [bond] agreement 
deprived plaintiffs of their contractual rights to receive payment . . . , defendants’ acts 
caused a direct effect to plaintiffs.”). 
 183 Morris, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 570–71. 
 184 Id. at 571. 
 185 541 U.S. 677 (2004) (holding that the FSIA is retroactive). 
 186 Id. at 677. 
 187 Id. 
 188 See id. 
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how courts decided assertions of immunity, quoting the Act: 
“[c]laims of foreign states to immunity should henceforth be 
decided by courts of the United States and of the States in 
conformity with the principles set forth in this chapter.”189  The 
Court interpreted this provision to mean that any assertion of 
immunity from the date the FSIA was enacted would be examined 
under the FSIA principles, regardless of when the original claim 
arose.190   
Responding to fears that allowing retroactivity would  “open[] 
foreign nations worldwide to vast and potential liability for 
expropriation claims in regards to conduct that occurred generations 
ago[,]”191  Justice Breyer wrote in his concurrence that “statutes of 
limitations, personal jurisdiction and venue requirements, and the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens will limit the number of suits 
brought in American courts.”192   
IV. Defenses of the PRC 
If a U.S. court grants jurisdiction, the PRC will assert three 
defenses, discussed in turn below. 
A. Successor Government 
Though it was not argued in Morris, in prior cases against the 
PRC, China has argued that the People’s Republic is not the 
successor to the Imperial Qing or Nationalist governments.193  It is 
unlikely this argument would succeed.  Customary international law 
provides for two types of succession: (1) succession of states and 
(2) succession of governments.194  The Restatement (Third) of 
Foreign Relations Law of the United States provides that a 
succession of state “may create a discontinuity in statehood 
[whereas] a succession of government [] leaves statehood 
unaffected.”195  The Restatement maintains that “[w]hen a state 
 
 189 Id. at 697 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1602) (emphasis added in original). 
 190 Id. at 697–99. 
 191 Altmann, 541 U.S. at 730 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 192 Id. at 713 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 193 See, e.g., Jackson v. People’s Republic of China, 550 F. Supp. 869, 872 (N.D. Ala. 
1982). 
 194 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 208 
n.2 (A.L.I. 1987). 
 195 Id. 
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succeeds another state with respect to particular territory, the 
capacities, rights, and duties of the predecessor state with respect to 
that territory terminate and are assumed by the successor state[.]”196  
The “capacities, rights, and duties [of a state] are not affected by a 
mere change in the regime or in the form of government or its 
ideology.”197   
U.S. courts have adopted the Restatement view.198  As early as 
1870, the Supreme Court held that “on . . . deposition [of the former 
government] the sovereignty [of the state] does not change, but 
merely the person or persons in whom it resides.”199  U.S. courts 
have determined that the Soviet government in Russia was the 
successor government to the Tsarist government.200  United States 
v. National City Bank201  involved claims brought by the United 
States (from claims assigned to it by the Soviet government) against 
the National City Bank.202  The United States was attempting to 
claim deposits at the National City Bank of $2.26 million originally 
deposited by a Russian bank which had been nationalized by the 
Soviet government (the Soviet claim against the bank’s deposits 
being assigned to the United States).203  The National City Bank 
sought to offset this claim by arguing they were owed $4.43 million 
for defaulted bonds they held, which had been issued by the Tsarist 
Government.204  The Court determined that the Soviet government 
did inherit the obligation to pay the Tsarist bonds, elegantly arguing 
“the State of Russia was the obligor on the Notes before the 
revolution and the State of Russia continued as the obligor after the 
revolution.  The regime in power changed.  The state, as a 
continuing personality, persisted.”205   
 
 196 Id. § 208. 
 197 Id. § 208 cmt. a. 
 198 See, e.g., Trans-Orient Marine Corp. v. Star Trading & Marine, Inc., 731 F. Supp. 
619, 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (“The law is clear that the obligations of a state are unaffected 
by a mere change in government.”). 
 199 The Sapphire, 78 U.S. 164, 168 (1870) (allowing the Court to hear a case that was 
brought by Emperor Napoleon against Americans regarding a French vessel to continue 
even after Napoleon was deposed). 
 200 E.g., United States v. Nat’l City Bank, 90 F. Supp. 448, 452 (S.D.N.Y 1950). 
 201 See generally id. 
 202 Id. at 452. 
 203 Id. at 451. 
 204 Id. 
 205 Id. at 452 (citing The Sapphire, 78 U.S. 164; Guaranty Trust Co. v. U.S., 304 U.S. 
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This principle was similarly applied regarding Sudan206  and the 
PRC in Jackson v. People’s Republic of China.207  In Jackson, the 
court held that “[t]he People’s Republic of China is the successor 
government to the Imperial Chinese Government and, therefore, the 
successor to its obligations.”208  The PRC, in emerging victorious in 
the Chinese Civil War, gained hegemony over the territory of the 
former Republic of China, itself succeeding to the territory of 
Imperial Qing.209  Under international law, the PRC assumed the 
rights and responsibilities of the Republic of China.210  Change of 
government through violent overthrow is still merely a change of 
government in the eyes of international law.211  And as discussed 
supra, the determinations of a “foreign state” for the FSIA purposes 
are to be examined through the lens of international law 
principles.212   
The United States at one time did not recognize the PRC as the 
legitimate sovereign, but this lack of recognition does not provide a 
 
126 (1938)). 
 206 Trans-Orient Marine Corp. v. Star Trading & Marine, Inc., 731 F. Supp. 619, 621 
(S.D.N.Y. 1990).  The plaintiff was a transportation agent shipping agricultural products 
from the United States to Sudan as part of a U.S. government program that allowed 
developed nations to purchase agricultural goods with low interest rates and long 
repayment periods.  The plaintiff had been granted an exclusive license to operate as 
Sudan’s agent for the purposes of this program.  Id. at 620 n.2.  The agreement between 
the plaintiff and the Sudanese government was signed in October 1983 and granted the 
exclusive license from October 1984 through September 1989.  In January 1985, the 
Sudanese government broke the agreement by granting the exclusive license to a different 
shipping company.  In April 1985, a military coup deposed the Sudanese government and 
created a new regime.  In June 1989, there was another military coup, installing a different 
military regime.  The plaintiff brought suit against the post-June 1989 military 
government, arguing they breached the 1983 agreement.  The military regime argued it 
was neither responsible for the contractual obligations of the prior government, nor was it 
responsible for the contractual obligations of the government before that one.  Id. at 620.  
The court held the new military regime liable for the contractual obligations of the pre-
April 1985 government, noting that “the obligations of a state are unaffected by a mere 
change in government.”  Id. at 623. 
 207 Jackson, 550 F. Supp. at 872. 
 208 Id. 
 209 See supra Section II.A.1 
 210 See Jackson, 550 F. Supp. at 872. 
 211 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 
208 cmt. a (A.L.I. 1987); Jackson, 550 F. Supp. at 872; Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. State of 
Russia, 21 F.2d 396, 401 (2d Cir. 1927). 
 212 See supra Section III.B.1. 
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defense for the PRC.  For example, in Lehigh Valley Railroad Co. 
v. Russia,213  the plaintiff was the U.S. government on behalf of the 
‘State of Russia’, pursuing the Valley Railroad Company for “loss 
of explosives and ammunition [in Lehigh Valley’s possession] 
while in transit from the United States to Russia[.]”214  The Tsarist 
government initiated the suit against Lehigh Valley, but upon the 
overthrow of the Tsarist government, the provisional government-
in-exile was allowed to continue the suit.215  The Second Circuit 
determined that a nation consisted of two entities: (1) the state, 
which “is a community or assemblage of men,” and (2) “the 
government[, which is] the political agen[t] through which it acts in 
international relations.”216  The “state is perpetual, and survives the 
form of its government.  The recognized government may carry on 
the suit, at least until the new government becomes accredited [by 
the political branches].”217  As the Eleventh Circuit noted during the 
Jackson appeal, the United States has recognized the PRC as the 
“political agent” of the ‘State of China’ since the 1970s.218  
Accordingly, the law on successor governments would result in the 
PRC inheriting the claims and obligations of the previous 
government.219  Upon recognition of the PRC by the United States, 
a court would find that an obligation against the ‘State of China’ is 
properly served against the PRC.220   
B. Odious Debt 
Another defense China has previously argued is that any debt 
incurred by a predecessor government is “odious debt.”221  The 
doctrine of odious debt is primarily an academic one as very few 
courts have discussed the concept and none of them have reached 
decisive holdings.222  One author defines an odious debt as one that 
 
 213 See generally Lehigh Valley R. Co., 21 F.2d 396. 
 214 Id. at 399. 
 215 Id. at 400. 
 216 Id. (citing State of Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 720 (1868); Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 22–28 (1831)). 
 217 Id. at 401. 
 218 See Jackson, 794 F.2d at 1491. 
 219 See Lehigh Valley, 21 F.2d at 399; Nat’l City Bank, 90 F. Supp. at 452. 
 220 See id. 
 221 See Jackson, 794 F.2d at 1495; Morris, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 565 n.6. 
 222 Jeff A. King, Odious Debt: The Terms of the Debate, 32 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. 
REG. 605, 644–48 (2007) (defining the doctrine of “odious debt,” discussing the authorities 
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is made: (1) in the “absence of the population’s consent, (2) absence 
of benefit to the population, and (3) [with] the creditor’s awareness 
of these facts.”223   
In 1956, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands denied the claim 
of a “Dutch national employed in the Netherlands Indies 
administration” who “claimed lost salary relating to a period of 
internment” suffered under Japanese occupation during World War 
II.224  The Dutch national argued that the Netherlands was still 
responsible for the salary, even though the obligation for that kind 
of debt was transferred to Indonesia under treaty.225  He believed 
that because Indonesia would consider the debt odious and 
repudiate it, the Netherlands was responsible for his pay.226  The 
Dutch court rejected the doctrine of odious debt, finding that “it had 
no application to that case.”227   
In a series of arbitrations between the United States and the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, in 
response to an Iranian argument that a 1948 contract for materiel 
from the United States was odious debt, also did not assert the 
existence of the doctrine.228  The Tribunal did state that “if such a 
doctrine did exist, it did so only in cases of state and not government 
succession.”229   
In the two cases brought in the United States regarding pre-1949 
Chinese debt, the PRC argued in the alternative that it was not liable 
for odious debts incurred by its predecessors.230  But neither court 
addressed the issue: one was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds 
and the other on procedural grounds.231   
 
in international law, and identifying key issues in advocating for or critiquing the doctrine). 
 223 Id. at 630. 
 224 Id. at 645. 
 225 Id. 
 226 Id. 
 227 Id. at 645. 
 228 King, supra note 222, at 645–46 (citing United States v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
32 Iran-US Cl. Trib. Rep. 162 (1996) (Chamber Two Award No. 574-B36-2 of 3 Dec. 
1996)). 
 229 Id. at 646. 
 230 Jackson, 794 F.2d at 1495; Morris, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 565 n.6. 
 231 Jackson, 794 F.2d at 1495 (finding no jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act because the Act did not apply retroactively – the Supreme Court would 
find the Act to apply retroactively in 2004); Morris, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 573 (finding that 
the statute of limitations had expired). 
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With the doctrine of odious debt unsettled in international and 
United State law, it is unlikely a U.S. court would recognize the 
doctrine against American interest.232  And even if the U.S. court 
did acknowledge the doctrine, it would likely argue, as the Iran-
United States Tribunal did, that it would not apply to debt incurred 
by the Republic of China or the Imperial Qing government, because 
the People’s Republic is only a successor government, not a 
successor state. 
C. Statute of Limitations 
The third defense the PRC has asserted in the past is that the 
statute of limitations bars recovery.  But it is important to note that, 
under federal law, a debt does not expire once the statute of 
limitations has run its course.233  Only Mississippi and Wisconsin 
“have statutes that extinguish the debt upon the running of the 
statute of limitations.”234  The American Bar Association notes that 
under federal law, debt is “an obligation to pay money[, but that 
definition does not] include[] the qualifier that the debt is still 
enforceable in court.”235   
For a court sitting in New York, the court “will apply New 
York’s ‘borrowing statute,’ to determine what statute of limitations 
to apply.”236  Most bonds cases will likely be heard in a federal or 
state court in New York as New York City’s preeminence as a 
financial mecca induces governments to issue their bonds in the 
state.237  “The New York statute of limitations for bringing ‘an 
 
 232 See Louis A. Perez Jr. & Deborah M. Weissman, Public Power and Private 
Purpose: Odious Debt and the Political Economy of Hegemony, 32 N.C. J. INT’L L. & 
COM. REG. 699, 712 (2007) (recounting the rejection of the odious debt doctrine by an 
arbitration overseen by the United States government regarding debt incurred by the 
former dictator of the Dominican Republic owed to an American company). 
 233 Thomas R. Dominczyk, Collecting Time-Barred Debt: Is It Worth the Risk?, 
A.B.A. (Apr. 22, 2014), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/ 
blt/2014/04/04_dominczyk/ [https://perma.cc/UT2D-TXVA]; see 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) 
(defining consumer debt without inclusion of a qualifier that the debt is still enforceable 
in court). 
 234 Dominczyk, supra note 233 (citing Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-3 (2018); Wis. Stat. 
Ann. § 893.05 (2020)). 
 235 Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)). 
 236 Morris, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 571 (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 202 (McKinney 2019)) 
(internal citation omitted). 
 237 See Susan Black & Anella Munro, Why Issue Bonds Offshore?, 52 BANK INT’L 
SETTLEMENTS PAPERS 97, 119 (2010). 
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action upon a contractual obligation or liability’ is six years.”238  
However, if the bond is “sold by the issuer after publication of an 
advertisement for bids for the issue in a newspaper of general 
circulation and secured only by a pledge of the faith and credit of 
the issuer,” then the statute of limitations is 20 years.239  Two 
inquiries are then undertaken to determine when the statute of 
limitations begins to run: (1) what is the injury and when does the 
injury take place; and (2) can the statute of limitations be tolled? 
Injury of Nonpayment of Principal and Interest 
Regarding the statute of limitations for a bond, “when a contract 
provides for the payment of money in installments, such as interest 
installments, the statute of limitations runs on each installment from 
the date it becomes due[.]”240  For example, the ‘4½% Gold Loan of 
1898’ has a 45-year maturity.241  Issued on March 2, 1898, payments 
were redeemable semi-annually on March 1 or September 1 until 
the year 1943.242  For the payment maturing on March 1, 1920, the 
statute of limitations began running on March 1, 1920, and expired 
March 1, 1926.243  Consequently, the New York statute of 
limitations expired for default on the last payment sometime in 
1949.244  Courts have, however, allowed the statute of limitations to 
“toll” if a superior power prevents the injured party from seeking 
redress.245   
Tolling from Lack of Forum due to a “Superior 
Power” 
A court may toll the statute of limitations if a “superior power” 
intervened.246  In the aftermath of the American Civil War, the 
Supreme Court was tasked to determine how the war affected legal 
rights of citizens in both the Union and the former Confederate 
 
 238 Morris, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 571 (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. 213(2) (McKinney 2019)). 
 239 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 211(a) (McKinney 2019). 
 240 Vigilant Ins. Co. of Am. v. Housing Auth. of City of El Paso, Tex., 660 N.E.2d 
1121, 1124–26 (N.Y. 1995). 
 241 Bond. No. 1898/3, art. 3, TREATIES 1, supra note 22, at 108. 
 242 4½% Gold Loan of 1898, supra note 37. 
 243 See id; N.Y. C.P.L.R. 213(2) (McKinney 2019). 
 244 See id. 
 245 See infra Section III.C.2. 
 246 See generally Hanger v. Abbott, 73 U.S. 532 (1867). 
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states.  In one case, Hanger v. Abbott,247  there was a question of 
whether the three-year statute of limitations in Arkansas for breach 
of contract continued to run during the Civil War.248  The plaintiff-
creditor was a resident of New Hampshire and the defendant-debtor 
a resident of Arkansas.249  The cause of action first accrued on 
October 25, 1859, but “all the lawful courts of the State where the 
defendant resided were closed by reason of the insurrection and 
rebellion[,]” from May 6, 1861 through January 1, 1865.250  The 
Court reasoned the “[a]bility to sue was the status of the creditor 
when the contract was made, but the effect of war is to suspend the 
right, not only without any fault on his part, but under circumstances 
which make it his duty to abstain from any such attempt.”251  
Consequently, 
it is the loss of the ability to sue that stops the running of the 
statute.  The inability may arise from a suspension of right, or 
from the closing of the courts, but whatever the original cause, the 
proximate and operative reason is that the claimant is deprived of 
the power to institute his suit.252   
As the Court clarified in Braun v. Sauerwein, where “the 
creditor has been disabled to sue, by a superior power, without any 
default of his own . . . the running of a statute of limitation may be 
suspended[.]”253  It is unclear, however, if tolling is only permissible 
where the plaintiff first had the right to sue, then lost it, or if tolling 
is also allowed where there was not an adequate tribunal to hear the 
case even at the time the contract was made; for instance, if the 
contract was formed during the era of absolute sovereign immunity.  
For the purpose of the below discussion, the author will assume that 
tolling is permissible where there was not an ability to sue at the 
time the contract was made. 
 
 247 See id. 
 248 Id at 533. 
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77 U.S. 218 (1869). 
 253 Braun, 77 U.S. at 222–23 (emphasis added). 
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a. Absolute Sovereign Immunity 
For any injury caused by a sovereign state that occurred prior to 
1952, a plaintiff has a strong argument that the statute of limitations 
should be tolled up to May 19, 1952, the date that the federal 
government adopted the theory of restrictive immunity.254  If, for 
example, a plaintiff held a 45-year 1898 Chinese Imperial bond, 
payable in New York, a plaintiff’s claim for defaulted annual 
interest coupons at the time of the injury (anywhere between 1899 
and 1943) could not be heard in the United States before 1952 
because the Chinese government could raise the defense of 
sovereign immunity and the U.S. court would dismiss on the theory 
of absolute sovereign immunity.255  Because there was no forum for 
the plaintiff to be heard, the statute of limitations on the plaintiff’s 
claims would be delayed until an adequate forum is found.256   
b. Tate Letter 
With the release of the Tate Letter, this same plaintiff gained the 
ability to sue the Chinese government.257  Consequently, the 
plaintiff’s claims expired in 1958, six years after the Tate Letter.258  
As noted during the FSIA Congressional hearings, however, the 
Tate Letter, while generally adopting the restrictive immunity 
theory, in practice, required courts to receive written notice from the 
executive branch detailing whether or not a nation should receive 
immunity in a particular case.259  However, after the Tate Letter, 
there were nominally two Chinese governments: the Nationalist 
Government in Taipei and the Communist Government in Beijing, 
muddies the water.260  And “[d]uring 1983 the foreign minister of 
China presented the Secretary of State with an Aide Memoire stating 
that the PRC recognized no obligation to pay external debts incurred 
by earlier Chinese governments[.]”261   
As discussed above, the State Department has allowed suit of 
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unrecognized states such as Iran and Cuba, but there has never been 
a situation where the Government allowed suit of an unrecognized 
de facto government when it also recognized an official government 
which did control territory, but did not have de facto control over 
the majority of the country.262  It is thus unclear whether a 
bondholder did in fact have the ability to sue the PRC, or if either 
the lack of recognition of the PRC or the arbitrary nature of lawsuits 
against sovereigns pre-FSIA would constitute a “superior power.” 
c. The FSIA 
If the same plaintiff can successfully make the argument that 
because neither the U.S. Congress nor the State Department 
recognized the PRC, the plaintiff could not have brought suit against 
the PRC until the passage of the FSIA in 1976, then the statute of 
limitations would be tolled to 1976.263  For the plaintiff, the vagaries 
of State Department sovereign immunity determinations have given 
way to objective analyses by the judiciary.264  Unlike the pre-FSIA 
scenario, it is more likely than not that a court would allow a suit 
against the PRC once the FSIA was enacted.  As discussed above, 
the definition of a “foreign state” in the Act is based on international 
law, rather than political branch diplomacy.265  In addition, the 
unrecognized PRC meets the criteria to qualify as a foreign state, 
for purposes of the FSIA, laid out by the Second Circuit in Morgan 
Guaranty: the PRC has the power (1) to declare and wage war; (2) 
to conclude peace; (3) to maintain diplomatic ties with other 
sovereigns; (4) to acquire territory by discovery and occupation; (5) 
to make international agreements and treaties.266  Further, the PRC 
possesses (6) a defined territory and (7) a permanent population (8) 
controlled by its own government.267  Consequently, the plaintiff’s 
statute of limitations would run from 1976 and expire in 1981.268 
An attempt to litigate pre-1949 bond claims using the tolling 
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argument was tried in the Morris case discussed supra.269  The 
bondholder’s tolling argument was unsuccessful in that the court 
dismissed the complaint as untimely.270  The court determined that 
the statute of limitations period, “[a]bsent tolling, . . . would be 
time-barred six years after payment on each interest coupon could 
be demanded.”271  To survive dismissal, the plaintiff had to “show 
that the statute of limitations was continuously tolled from at least 
1966 until no more than six years before the present action.”272   
The Morris plaintiff argued that there were several “‘superior 
powers’ that precluded suit on the bonds.”273  These included that 
(1) “both World War II and the Communist Revolution in China 
prevented courts from hearing this claim”; (2) “the American 
government’s prior policy of granting sovereigns absolute 
immunity” prevented suit; (3) the “suit could not be bought [sic] in 
a federal court while the PRC was a non-recognized government”; 
(4) “there was no way to effect service until China became a party 
to the Hague Service Convention in 1991”; and (5) the “FSIA was 
not retroactive when it was passed and did not become retroactive 
until the Supreme Court so found in” Altmann.274   
The court disagreed, concluding that “foreign governments 
could be subject to suit since the issuance of the Tate letter in 
1952[,]”275  and that “the FSIA was in fact retroactive from the 
moment it became law and allowed suit on this claim no later than 
1976.”276  The court finished its analysis by stating that even “[i]f 
plaintiff is correct that no court could entertain his claim against the 
PRC until it was recognized by the United States, then he is still 
only entitled to tolling into the 1980s.”277   
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Pari Passu Obligations 
Were a U.S. court to agree with the District Court in Morris, the 
same hypothetical plaintiff is left holding a pretty-looking antique 
if they failed to sue by 1981.  The above analysis, however, was 
predicated on the plaintiff claiming an injury of default on the 
coupons and principal payments.  A recent case in the Second 
Circuit, NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina,278  has 
presented the possibility that another type of injury could allow 
plaintiffs to pursue claims on these old bonds. 
Sovereign bonds commonly contain a pari passu clause: pari 
passu is Latin for “by equal step,” and is defined as 
“[p]roportionally; at an equal pace; without preference[.]”279  
Generally, the clause acts to ensure that creditors within the same 
or similar class of debt are treated equally because “[w]hen 
sovereigns default[,] they do not enter bankruptcy proceedings 
where the legal rank of debt determines the order in which creditors 
will be paid[,] the [pari passu clause] prevents [a sovereign] as 
payor from discriminating against [one set of bonds] in favor of 
[another].”280   
a. NML Capital v. Argentina 
In 2012, the Second Circuit heard NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic 
of Argentina.281  In 1994, Argentina issued bonds in New York, 
governed under a Fiscal Agency Agreement (“FAA”).282  The FAA 
contained a pari passu clause, which read: 
The Securities will constitute . . . direct, unconditional, unsecured 
and unsubordinated obligations of the Republic and shall at all 
times rank pari passu without any preference among themselves.  
The payment obligations of the Republic under the Securities 
shall at all times rank at least equally with all its other present and 
future unsecured and unsubordinated External Indebtedness[.]283   
 
 278 NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. 
denied, 571 U.S. 941 (2013). 
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The plaintiffs held bonds issued under this FAA prior to 2001.284   
In 2001, Argentina defaulted on these bonds, instead offering 
new bonds in exchange in 2005 and 2010.285  The Argentine 
government refused to pay any interest or principal on the older 
bonds.286  The plaintiffs sued, arguing that “Argentina’s conduct 
violated the [pari passu clause] by both subordinating their [older] 
Bonds to the Exchange Bonds and lowering the ranking of their 
[older] Bonds below the Exchange Bonds.”287   
The Exchange Bonds included in their prospectus a disclaimer 
that any of the older bonds that were not exchanged would “remain 
in default indefinitely” because “[t]he Government has announced 
that it has no intention of resuming payment on any bonds eligible 
to participate in [the] exchange offer[.]”288  The Argentinean 
legislature also passed a law that forbade the Government from 
making any “in-court, out-of-court or private settlement with 
respect to” the unexchanged bonds (called the “Lock Law”).289  The 
plaintiffs had refused to exchange their old bonds at either the 2005 
or 2010 exchange offerings.290   
The Second Circuit interpreted the FAA agreement to provide 
bondholders with “protect[ion] against [two] different forms of 
discrimination: the issuance of other superior debt and the giving of 
priority to other payment obligations.”291  The court found multiple 
ways in which the Argentine government had subordinated the 
plaintiffs’ bonds in favor of the Exchange Bonds: (1) “Argentina 
made no payments for six years on plaintiffs’ bonds while 
simultaneously timely servicing the Exchange Bonds”; (2) 
“Argentina  . . .  renewed [a] moratorium in its budget laws each 
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year since” 2001 forbidding payment on plaintiffs’ bonds; (3) 
prospectuses for new Argentine bonds declared that Argentina “has 
no intention of resuming payments on” plaintiffs’ bonds; (4) 
Argentina “stated in SEC filings that it had ‘classified the 
[plaintiffs’ bonds] as a separate category from its regular debt’ and 
is ‘not in a legal position to pay’ them”; and (5) the Argentine 
legislature passed the Lock Law forbidding settlement of the 
plaintiffs’ bonds, whereas, “were Argentina to default on the 
Exchange Bonds, and were the bondholders to obtain New York 
judgments against Argentina, there would be no barrier to the 
Republic’s courts recognizing those judgments.”292   
The Second Circuit found that Argentina “violated the [pari 
passu clause] by persisting in its policy of discriminatory treatment 
of plaintiffs, for example, by passing the Lock Law.”293  The District 
Court had “suggested that a breach would occur with any non-
payment that is coupled with payment on other debt[,]” and the 
Second Circuit did not overrule that holding.294  However, when the 
Second Circuit heard an appeal from the district court’s updated 
injunction order, it clarified that: 
Our decision here does not control the interpretation of all pari 
passu clauses or the obligations of other sovereign debtors under 
pari passu clauses in other debt instruments.  As we explicitly 
stated in our last opinion, we have not held that a sovereign debtor 
breaches its pari passu clause every time it pays one creditor and 
not another, or even every time it enacts a law disparately 
affecting a creditor’s rights.  We simply affirm the district court’s 
conclusion that Argentina’s extraordinary behavior was a 
violation of the particular pari passu clause found in the FAA.295 
What is the consequence of this ruling for the hypothetical 
plaintiff?  Depending on the language of the pari passu clause in 
their bond terms, any time the Chinese government pays out to other 
bonds, and does not pay on the defaulted bonds, there is a new 
injury.296   
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Currently, China has at least fourteen outstanding bond series.297  
At least one of these bonds, ISIN code XS1706605281, was set to 
pay a coupon on November 2, 2019.298  If China does pay that 
coupon, the injury would result on November 2, 2019, and the 
statute of limitations would run for six years after that, expiring in 
2025; thus, allowing a plaintiff to bring suit in the next few years. 
b. Remedies 
In the NML Capital case, the Second Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s grant of specific performance: Argentina had to pay its 
obligations under the pari passu clause.299  In addition, “whenever 
the Republic pays any amount due under the terms of the 
[Exchange] [B]onds, it must concurrently or in advance pay 
plaintiffs the same fraction of the amount due to them[.]”300  The 
district court “ordered that copies of the Injunctions be provided to 
all parties involved, directly or indirectly, in advising upon, 
preparing, processing, or facilitating any payment on the Exchange 
Bonds.”301  The judge’s order forbade “Argentina’s agents from 
aiding and abetting any further violation by [Argentina] of its 
obligations [under the pari passu clause], such as any efforts to 
make payments under the terms of the Exchange Bonds without also 
concurrently or in advance making a ratable payment to 
[plaintiffs].”302   
The District Court also prohibited Argentina from changing how 
it made payments on the Exchange Bonds to prevent Argentina from 
creating an avenue by which it could pay the Exchange Bonds 
without paying plaintiffs.303  These strict measures were justified 
because Argentina created a disingenuous and “unprecedented, 
systematic scheme of making payments on other external 
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indebtedness, after repudiating its payment obligations to 
Plaintiffs[.]”304  The Second Circuit upheld the injunctions.305   
However, it is unclear whether a court would impose these 
injunctions on China.  Complicating factors include (1) that the debt 
was not originally incurred by the government of the PRC and (2) 
that China had settled certain claims with the United Kingdom in 
1987.306  A court might look more kindly on a government that did 
not voluntarily incur the debt, but it may look unfavorably where 
China has paid British bondholders but not bondholders of other 
nationalities for historical debt.307   
The same plaintiff may have one last avenue of resort available.  
In 1964, the Supreme Court of California heard Coast Bank v. 
Minderhout.308  The plaintiff, Coast Bank, made a series of loans to 
Burton and Donald Enright from January 18 to November 12, 
1957.309  The Enrights “executed a promissory note for the full 
amount of the indebtedness.”310  In a separate instrument, the 
Enrights “agreed that they would not transfer or encumber without 
[Coast Bank’s] consent certain real property owned by them until 
all of their indebtedness was paid.”311  Coast Bank had the right to 
“declare all remaining indebtedness due forthwith” if the Enrights 
defaulted.312   
In November 1958, still owing Coast Bank, the Enrights 
“conveyed the property to defendants without plaintiff’s knowledge 
or consent.”313  Coast Bank proceeded to “accelerate the due date, 
but was unable to collect the unpaid balance.”314  Consequently, 
Coast Bank brought suit against the defendants, arguing that the 
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Enright’s instruments created an “equitable mortgage.”315  As the 
court noted: 
[E]very express executory agreement in writing, whereby the 
contracting party sufficiently indicates an intention to make some 
particular property, real or personal, or fund, therein described or 
identified, a security for a debt or other obligation creates an 
equitable lien upon the property so indicated, which is enforceable 
against the property in the hands not only of the original 
contractor, but of his purchasers or encumbrancers with notice.316   
The court stated that “the instrument restricts the rights of the 
Enrights in dealing with their property for plaintiff’s benefit[,]” and 
thus “afford some indication that the parties intended to create a 
security interest” in the property.317  The court decided that “[t]he 
creation of [the security] interest was a . . . lawful object of the 
agreement[,]” thus allowing Coast Bank to “foreclose its security 
interest” against the defendants.318   
If the hypothetical plaintiff could show that their pre-1949 bond 
included a term which granted a security interest over either future 
loans of the Chinese government, or over Chinese revenues 
generally, then, theoretically, a plaintiff could pursue its security 
interest against current bondholders for the payments received from 
the Chinese government.319   
V. Concluding Framework 
The possibility of successfully navigating a suit to claim 
damages on bonds that were issued over a century ago is unlikely.  
As such, anyone attempting to do so must learn “a verie formall 
art  . . .  with manie excellent superstitions and ceremonies[.]”320   
A. Jurisdiction 
A plaintiff first must overcome the jurisdictional hurdle of the 
FSIA.  Three requirements must be met: (1) the state a foreign state, 
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(2) the activity a commercial activity, and (3) there is a “direct 
effect” in the United States.321  The first two questions are clearly 
met for a claim brought by a holder of pre-1949 Chinese bonds: the 
PRC has been adjudged a FSIA foreign state and issuing 
government bonds is a commercial activity under the Act.  Finding 
a “direct effect in the United States” test is more uncertain.322   
Helpful evidence of “direct effects” include: (a) a breach of 
contract when performance was validly requested in the United 
States; (b) ownership of the bonds by a U.S. citizen at the time of 
default; (c) whether the bonds were issued in the United States; (d) 
whether the bonds were issued or payable in dollars; (e) whether the 
PRC had a designated agent to administer the bonds in the United 
States; and (f) whether any negotiations concerning the bond 
occurred within the United States.323   
A pre-1949 bond that meets some of these criteria is the 
“Imperial Chinese Government 5% Hukuang Railways Sinking 
Fund Gold Loan of 1911” from Jackson.324  This bond provides that 
“[a]ll payments of principal and interest on this Bond will be made 
in  . . .  New York in Dollars at the offices of Messrs. J.P. Morgan 
and Co., Messrs. Kuhn, Loeb & Co., The First National Bank of the 
City of New York and the National City Bank of New York[.]”325   
Likewise, a court may find no evidence of “direct effects” if 
there is: (a) no evidence of prior American ownership of the bonds; 
(b) if plaintiff’s bonds were not issued to American banks; (c) that 
there were no designated locations or negotiations in the United 
States; and (d) that the bonds were not in U.S. dollars.326  Morris 
concerned a Chinese bond that, because its terms did not allow 
redemption in the United States, the court found it did not have a 
“direct effect” in the United States.327   
B. Procedural Bars 
A defendant-nation would assert that the claims brought against 
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it from an old bond are untimely.328  If the plaintiff argues breach of 
contract for failure to pay the principal or interest payment, the 
defense will win, and the case will be dismissed.329  Because the 
statute of limitations is six years, most old claims expired in the 
1940s.330  Even if the plaintiff can find “superior powers” that 
persuade the court to toll the statute of limitations, there were no 
barriers to sue the PRC after the passage of the FSIA in 1976.331  
And even if a court believed that the statute should be tolled because 
the Supreme Court did not clarify that the FSIA was retroactive until 
2004, the statute of limitations expired in 2010.332   
Plaintiffs whose bonds have certain pari passu clauses will be 
able to argue that a new injury occurs every time their pari passu 
clause is violated.333  These clauses are violated any time the 
sovereign debtor pays creditors who hold subordinate bonds while 
refusing to pay the debtor.334  The substance of this argument will 
be discussed in the next section.  Nonetheless, the important 
procedural point is that the six-year statute begins running from the 
date these new injuries occur, and thus, claims arising from 
contemporary pari passu injuries are not stale. 
C. Substantive Requirements 
Breach of contract for default on interest or principal payments 
are substantively easy to prove.  If the bondholder is the rightful 
owner of the bond, and the payments have not been made, the debtor 
is in default and owes restitution to the creditor. 
But the ‘pari passu injuries’ are more difficult to prove 
substantively.335  Only the NML Capital case provides any guidance 
and the Second Circuit purposefully limited the scope of its holding 
to Argentina.336  The two factors the Second Circuit relied upon to 
find injury were (1) the clear priority protections granted to 
bondholders and (2) the actions of the debtor-nation to avoid paying 
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the debt.337   
The “Chinese Imperial Government Gold Loan of 1898” 
includes the following provision: “[t]his entire loan shall have 
priority both as regards principal and interest over all future loans, 
charges or mortgages so long as this loan or any part thereof shall 
be unredeemed.”338  This broad grant of priority is similar to the 
Argentine bonds in NML Capital.339  Conversely, the 
“Reorganisation” bond in Morris provided, in Article IV, that: “The 
entire loan  . . .  shall have priority both as regards to principal and 
interest over all future loans, charges and mortgages charged upon 
the [“revenues of the Salt Administration of China”] so long as this 
loan or any part thereof shall be unredeemed.”340  The Morris bond 
only has priority over bonds that also derive revenues from the Salt 
Administration of China, which disintegrated during the Second 
World War.341  Thus, plaintiffs with pari passu clauses reflective of 
the “Gold Loan of 1898” have a stronger argument for a ‘pari passu 
injury’ than those like the Morris bond. 
The plaintiff also has to prove that China is a recalcitrant debtor-
nation, akin to Argentina in NML Capital.  Evidence of recalcitrance 
includes the PRC’s historic repudiation of Imperial and Nationalist 
debt and the disparate treatment of American and British 
bondholders by compensating British bondholders while refusing to 
pay American bondholders.342   
 
 337 See id. at 258–59. 
 338 E.g., 4½% Gold Loan of 1898, supra note 37. 
 339 See supra Section IV.C.3.a 
 340 Bond No. 1913/5, Fr. (Banque de l’Indo-Chine)-Ger. (Deutsch-Asiatische Bank)-
Gr. Brit. (Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corp.)-Japan (Yokohama Specie Bank)-Russ. 
(Russo-Asiatic Bank)-China, art. 4, Chinese Government Five per Cent Reorganization 
Gold Loan Agreement (with Agreement for Advances, and Annexes) (Apr. 26, 1913), 
reprinted in TREATIES 2, supra note 22, at 1008.  See 4½% Gold Loan of 1898, supra note 
37, at 2, para. 3(b). 
 341 ARTHUR N. YOUNG, CHINA’S WARTIME FINANCE AND INFLATION, 1937–1945 50–
53 (Harvard Univ. Press 2013) (1965) (explaining that the salt production facilities were 
captured by the Japanese early in the war and when the Communists seized power, they 
established their own salt monopoly, the China National Salt Industry Corporation); see 
China National Salt Industry Corporation (CNSIC), GOVT.CHINADAILY.COM.CN, 
http://govt.chinadaily.com.cn/s/201904/22/WS5cbd8917498e079e6801eb5b/china-
national-salt-industry-corporation-cnsic.html [https://perma.cc/4BSS-ZWWJ] (last 
updated Apr. 22, 2019). 
 342 See China, Britain Settle Claims, supra note 70; H.R. Con. Res. 160, 110th Cong. 
(2007) (recommending that the PRC be denied access to U.S. capital markets until it 
complies with the WTO Agreement terms and conditions and honors its outstanding 
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D. Remedy 
This paper has not discussed the difficulty of enforcing 
judgements on foreign sovereigns.  Other writers have addressed 
this.343  In brief, “[i]t is easier to obtain a judgment against a foreign 
state than to execute that judgment.”344   
But a plaintiff who can bring a ‘pari passu injury’ like in NML 
Capital may be able to seize revenues paid to other bonds from the 
same issuer.  Coast Bank allowed the creditor to seize property from 
a third party because the lending contract to the debtor created an 
‘equitable mortgage.’345  If a bond contains contractual language 
which allows subordination of future bonds or first liens on a 
country’s revenue, then the bondholder could pursue payments 
made to a bondholder with a subordinate bond.  The Morris bond 
discussed above, by its terms, only allows priority over revenues 
from the Salt Administration of China, and because no payments 
are being made from this revenue stream, a plaintiff holding such 
bonds would be unsuccessful bringing a claim for violating the pari 
passu clause.346  Contrasting the bond in Morris with the “Gold 
Loan of 1898,” the Gold Loan creates priority over all future 
obligations of any kind, regardless of security or revenue stream, 
and, thus, present a bondholder with a higher likelihood of success 
bringing a claim under the pari passu clause. 
VI. Conclusion 
A pre-1949 bondholder can be forgiven for feeling as though the 
law in this field is like the fruit tree and pool of water in Tartarus, 
which taunts the thirsty without ever delivering refreshment.347  
Very few factual situations exist that justify a court finding “direct 
effects” in the United States and suspending the passage of time by, 
for example, a perpetual broad-reaching pari passu clause.  This is 
perhaps an intentional manifestation of an ameliorative policy for 
rehabilitated creditors.  As idiosyncratic as the law may seem in this 
 
defaulted public debts owed to U.S. citizens). 
 343 See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Refining the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 9 
WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 57, 75–78 (2001). 
 344 Id. at 75. 
 345 See Coast Bank, 392 P.2d at 265. 
 346 See Morris, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 572 n.16. 
 347 See PSEUDO-APOLLODORUS, THE LIBRARY (James G. Frazer trans., Harvard Univ. 
Press 1921). 
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area, the results are roughly fair.  The beneficial flows of 
development capital in the present at some point should no longer 
be arrested by the unfinished business of prior generations.  
Accordingly, those desiring a return on their objet d’art through the 
courts perhaps are better advised instead to find an executive branch 
solution, perhaps a bellicose administration that demands 
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